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INTRODUCTION 
This monograph is addressed to estate planning problems created by the 
existence of joint tenancy arrangements in property for which an estate plan 
is to be developed. Because joint tenancies are extensively used in Iowa and 
estates are becoming more valuable, the problems created by joint tenancy 
are increasing in importance. The discussion proceeds on the premise that in 
the usual situation the estate planner must take the property arrangements 
as he finds them, because he usually comes on the scene too late to affect 
the initial choice of ownership form. His task is to unearth and unravel the 
O\vnership relations established by his client in the past and to consider the 
adjustments required to attain the client's estate planning goals. 
Because there are several forms of joint O\vnership existent in Iowa and 
even more were possible under the common law, it is necessary to isolate the 
estate of joint tenancy with some precision. As used herein, joint tenancy 
refers to that form of concurrent o\vnership, of either a legal or an equitable 
estate, in which two or more parties have been transferred undivided interests 
in the estate, by deed or other\\·ise, and in which each co-o\vner may poten-
tially succeed to a larger share of the ownership by surviving the other co-
owners. 
The organization of the materials herein is designed to approximate the 
analytical process an estate planner would ordinarily follow when confronted 
with an estate containing jointly O\vned property. First he must satisfy him-
self that the relationship created was a joint tenancy. Next, if he confirms the 
creation of a joint tenancy, he must investigate to determine whether the 
relationship has continued intact down to the present. Once he is satisfied that 
the client has one or more joint tenancies, he must consider what adjustments, 
if any, should be made in the ownership arrangements. An evaluation of the 
human, property, and tax aspects of each joint tenancy in light of the over-all 
estate plan may be required to determine what changes are recommended. 
If the decision is made to sever some of the joint tenancies, consideration 
must be given to the most practical and economical method of severance. 
If it is determined that a joint tenancy should not be dissolved, attention 
must be focused on integrating it into the total estate plan. Numerous com-
plications are encountered at every stage of this process. 
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VERIFYING THE EXISTENCE OF A JOINT TENANCY 
If it is true that the typical estate for which planning assistance is requested 
contains several jointly owned assets, it seems obvious that to function 
effectively an estate planner must have a thorough knowledge of the rules 
governing the creation and termination of joint tenancies. Untangling a client's 
ownership arrangements requires a careful examination of the deeds, con-
tracts, bills of sale, wills, and other instruments upon which ownership is 
founded, plus inquiry into the parties' unwritten agreements and their prac-
tices in dealing with the jointly owned property. Appreciation of the subtle 
distinctions that may be significant in determining whether property is jointly 
owned requires keen insights into the requisites of creation and severance of 
the joint tenancy relationship. The great extent to which tax results in this 
area are determined by local property laws further underlines the value of 
fully understanding these problems. 
An awareness of the historical background of joint ownership is essential 
to understanding the nature of the joint tenancy relationship. Joint tenancy 
had its roots in feudal England as a form of ownership of real property. 1 
Later as personal property gained significance in the makeup of individual 
wealth, the real property rules were adapted to joint ownership of personalty. 2 
In the last century, when joint tenancy of real property fell from favor, 3 
similar treatment was accorded personal property joint O\vnership. 4 More 
recently, the popularity of certain types of survivorship arrangements involv-
ing personal property, such as joint bank accounts, has led to a relaxation 
in the stringency of the legal requisites in the personal property sphere. 5 Now, 
to some extent, it seems things have come full circle and the more liberal 
personal property concepts are being applied to joint interests in realty. 6 To 
what extent the recent shifts have been influenced by the impact of taxation 
is open to conjecture, but no one who reads the cases of the last thirty years 
can doubt that significant changes have taken place. 
Because joint tenancy is one of the few areas of property law which has 
undergone substantial changes in recent years, it is not enough for the estate 
planner to remember what the law \vas. He must keep his knowledge in this 
area current and because he is planning for the future, he n1ust search for 
trends that may enable him to anticipate tomorrow's changes. The following 
1 See 2 Pollack & Maitland, History of English Law 20 (2d ed. 1899). 
2 See 2 Blackstone, Commentaries :;: 399. 
3 See 4 Thompson, Real Property §§ 1775, 1782 (Rev. ed. 1961). 
4 See W11liams, Personal Property 522 (18th ed. 1926). 
5 See Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W. 2d 870 (1951). 
G See, e g, Hruby v. Wayman, 230 Iowa 653. 298 N.\V. 639 ( 1941) · Conlee v Conlee, 
222 Iowa 561, 269 N.W. 259 (1937). 
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discussion is an attempt to depict accurately the state of the joint tenancy 
law in Iowa today. Wherever an apparent trend is discovered, it will be noted. 
NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
The characteristic of joint tenancy that distinguishes it from other types 
of co-ownership is the right of survivorship. This right arises out of the con-
cept that property held in joint tenancy is held "by the whole," which means 
that each joint tenant, while living, owns all the property subject only to the 
claims of the other tenant or tenants. The tenants do not own merely a pro-
portionate interest in the property as do tenants in common. Upon the death 
of the other joint tenants, the survivor becomes sole owner of the entire 
property. This ownership arises not because of any interest passing from the 
decedent to the survivor; rather, it is because the interest of the decedent 
terminates and the survivor's interest is now free of any other interest in the 
property. The Iovva Supreme Court has explained the concept thusly: 
"In a legal sense, his death does not transfer the n ghts that he possessed in the 
property to the surviving tenant. Death does not enlarge the estate. Death termi-
nates his interest in the estate. It is rather a falling away of the tenant from the 
estate than the passing of the estate to others."7 
During the life of the joint tenants each is entitled to a share of the income 
from the property proportionate to his interest therein. 8 In absence of evi-
dence of unequal contributions, the co-tenants are presumed to take equal 
interests in the jointly owned property.0 Where there is a showing of unequal 
contributions, the interests are presumed to be in the same proportion as the 
contributions.1 o 
CREATION R EAL PROPERTY 
At common law a conjunction of the four elements or unities was neces-
sary to the establishment of a valid joint tenancy. If any one of the unities 
was missing, no joint tenancy was created. The unities were: 
1. Unity of Tune-the interests of the joint tenants had to vest at the 
same time. 
7 Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 88, 89, 174 N.W. 946, 953 (1922). 
8 See 4 Thompson, Real Property § 1799 (Rev. ed. 196 1). 
0 See in re Estate of Anders, 238 Iowa 344, 26 N.W. 2d 67 (1947). 
lOSeeLowell v. Lowell, 185 Iowa 508,170 N.W. 811 (1919). Note that these presump-
tions do not exactly jibe with those of §2040 of the Internal Revenue Code. In other 
jurisdictions, markedly unequal contributions to joint tenancy property have been 
used to raise a constructive trust in favor of the estate of the first to dte. See Kane v. 
Johnson, 397 Ill. 112, 73 N.E.2d 321 ( 1947); Moss & Siebert, Cla.HL/ication and 
Creation of Joint Interest ~, 1959 U. Ill. Law Forum 883. 
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2. Unity of Title the title of all the joint tenants had to be derived from 
the same instrument. 
3. Unity of Interest the interests of all the joint tenants had to be co-
extensive, that is, each joint tenant had to ha\e an c~tate of the same 
type and duration. 
4. Unity of Possession each joint tenant had to have the san1e right to 
possession of the property. 
Generally Iowa has abandoned the four unities requirement in regard to 
the creation of a joint tenancy and has shifted emphasis to the intention of 
the grantor. The notion of making the creating party's intention determinative 
dates back to the Iowa Code of 1851; however, the court was relatively slow 
in coming to that realization. The departure fron1 observance of the common 
law requirements did not clearly occur until the court held in SH. itzer v. Pratt11 
that a conveyance by a husband to himself and his \vife creates a joint tenancy 
where appropriate language is used. 
Although intent has become the touchstone in resolving uncertainties, the 
Iowa law cannot be said to favor joint tenancies. On the contrary, Section 
5 57.15 of the Iowa Code provides that a conveyance to t\vo or more persons 
in their own right creates a tenancy in comn1on unless a contrary intent is 
expressed.12 This Code Section has long been regarded as manifesting a 
policy against the creation of joint tenancies in Iowa.13 If the language of the 
creating mstrument is ambiguous and the intent unclear, the statutory pre-
sumption will require a finding that a tenancy in common was created.14 
Although the statute uses the term "conveyances," the court has applied the 
Code provision equally to wills. 15 
For the creating instrument to unquestionably rebut the statutory presump-
tion, whether a conveyance or a will, it should clearly provide that the prop-
11 237 Iowa 788, 23 N.W.2d 837 ( 1946). Although it could be argued that Conlee v. 
Conlee, 222 Iowa 561, 269 N.W. 259 (1927) marked a clear break wnh the four 
unities. 
12 "Conveyances to two or more in their own right create a tenancy in common, unless 
a contrary intent is expressed." Iowa Code§ 557.15 (1962). 
1:l See Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302, 307 ( 1869), where the court said: "With us, 
therefore, when the estate is held by two or more, not as trustees, but in their own 
right, nothing being expressed to the contrary, the tenancy would be in common. 
And thus most plainly and authoritatively is the estate of joint tenancy disfavored 
by our law. There is no reason, no necessity for such an estate, except under the 
most peculiar circumstances .... And as now we in most of the states condemn en-
tailments or perpetuities, so we do and should joint tenancies, or at least their com-
mon-law incident, ... the right of survivorship." 
14 See Foley v. Engstrom, 247 Iowa 774, 74 N.W.2d 673 (1956). 
1 5 See In re Estate of Heckman, 228 Iowa 967, 291 N.W. 465 ( 1940); In re Estate of 
Carter, 203 Iowa 603, 213 N.W. 392 (1927). 
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erty is to be taken by the parties "as joint tenants vvith the right of survivor-
ship, and not as tenants in common." Such language performs the function 
of expressly articulating the specific attribute of survivorship while simultan-
eously negating any intent to create a tenancy in common.16 Where the grant-
ing instrument contains something less than this phraseology, the estate 
planner begins to earn his fee. 
Construing the Creating Instrument 
The Iowa court has repeatedly been called upon to determine whether a 
particular instrument manifests an intent contrary to a tenancy in common. 
In some of these cases the court has restricted its search for contrary intent to 
an examination of the specific language used with reference to the joint 
ownership. This inquiry has been complicated by attempts to apply the tra-
ditional rules of construction to reconcile conflicting provisions in the instru-
ment. In several cases the court has based its decision on the over-all import 
of the instrument read as a whole. 
Generally, where specific language is relied upon to prove contrary intent, 
the court has tended to require the use of terminology technically com-
petent to create a joint tenancy. The one exception to this generalization is 
that where the conveying instrument unequivocally specifies a survivorship 
arrangement, the court has been willing to recognize an intent to create a 
joint tenancy. 
Thus, a deed growing out of a voluntary partition among heirs that pro-
vided, "Said real estate being taken by said grantees jointly . . . to have and 
to hold the above described real estate to the said grantees, their assigns, 
heirs, and devisees forever" was held ineffective to create a joint tenancy.17 
The court observed that the term "jointly" was insufficient to create a joint 
tenancy and that the subsequent language in the granting clause clearly 
negated any survivorship rights. Similarly, a will provision which devised 
property to "my two daughters Lana and Dana jointly in equal shares, that 
is to say to each an undivided one-half thereof" was held incompetent to 
create a joint tenancy. 1 8 
The requirement of technically competent language reached its zenith in 
Fay v. Smiley19 where a deed to a husband and wife "as tenants by the entirety 
and not as tenants in common" resulted in a tenancy in common. A careful 
reading of the decision discloses that it is very limited authority on either 
tenancy by the entirety is summarized thus: "In other words we do not wish 
l G See Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 23 N.W.2d 837 ( 1946). 
17 Albright v. Winey, 226 Iowa 222, 284 N.W. 86 (1939). 
18 In re Estate of Heckman, 228 Iowa 967, 291 N .W. 465 ( 1940). 
ln 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N.W. 369 {1926); Note, 12 Iowa L. Rev. 415 (1927). cf. Iowa 
Code§ 637.3; Note, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 551 (1957). 
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to hold that an estate can be created simply by naming it, v,rithout the neces-
sary words descriptive of such estate." The court was careful to point out 
the narrow issue it had decided. "It may be that, had there been a subsequent 
provision of the deed in specific 'Words detailing an estate which would, at 
common law, have been an estate in entirety, we would be disposed to recog-
nize the creation of such an estate; . . . . " 
No contention was made in Fay v. Smiley that the estate created was a 
joint tenancy. Because one of the parties had conveyed away his interest 
before the suit, such a relationship would have been severed, so the issue was 
whether the property was held by tenants by the entirety or tenants in com-
mon. Therefore, the decision is not authority on the question of whether a 
joint tenancy may be validly created by a grant to "A and B as joint tenants 
and not as tenants in common." At least one distinguished Iowa commentator 
has gone on record with the view that such language should be sufficient. 20 
Because the survivorship feature is the distinguishing characteristic of joint 
tenancy, an instrument that specifies this right between co-owners is generally 
found to create a joint tenancy. Concerning a deed to a named husband and 
wife "or the survivor of either," the court said, "The word survivor or 
survivorship has no equivocal meaning and as here used is not an incident 
to the creation of a tenancy in common .... We conclude that the language 
in the granting clause is sufficient to clearly manifest an intention to create 
an estate in joint tenancy with survivorship incident thereto. "21 
The survivorship right must apply to the entire property, hovvever, and not 
just to an interest therein. Where the language of the grant was "to go and 
be held by either (H and W) whichever survives the other, and be held by 
said survivor undivided until the death of said survivor, when title to said 
land is to be vested in the legal heirs of above grantees as the law directs," 
the court decided that the co-tenants held as tenants in common, with each 
tenant's interest subject to a life estate in the survivor of them. 22 
So central is the survivorship right to the joint tenancy relationship that 
the court has on occasion found a valid creation of a joint tenancy where the 
granting instrument read as a whole manifested an intent for survivorship. 
The deed in Wood v. Logue23 described the rights in terms of "inherit," but 
the court found, in interpreting the incorrect term in the context of the entire 
instrument, that a joint tenancy was obviously intended. Conversely, an intent 
against survivorship may also be discovered through an examination of the 
granting instrument from the viewpoint of over-all dispositive intent. ~4 
20 Marshall, Iowa Title Opinions and Standards § 3.2( c). 
21 Hruby v. Wayman, 230 Iowa 653, 298 N.W. 639 (1941). 
22 Gruwell v. Gruwell, 185 Io'Wa 581, 171 N.W. 290 (1919) 
23 167 Iowa 436, 171 N.W. 290 (1914). 
24 See In re Estate of Heckman, 228 Iowa 967, 291 N.W. 465 (1940). 
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Effect of Extrinsic Evidence and Agreentents 
Investigation into the circun1stances surrounding the execution of an am-
biguous instrument is not only a legitimate technique for solving construction 
problems, it is also a necessary one where, as in the joint tenancy area, the 
whole thrust of the interpretive process is directed to discovering intent. Thus, 
the court has been receptive to extrinsic evidence which has the effect of 
placing the questioned instrument in perspective. Perhaps the clearest example 
of the value of such evidence is Albright v. Winey, 25 where the showing that 
the deed creating the co-ownership emanated from a voluntary partition 
among heirs, foreclosed, as a practical matter, any liklihood that the instru-
ment would be found to create a joint tenancy. 
Not so easily understood, however, is the court's demonstrated willingness 
to rely on proof of an agreement extrinsic to the granting instrument to find 
that a joint tenancy was created. On three of four occasions the court has 
recognized rights based on survivorship agreements, two of which were not 
discoverable in the title instruments of the property affected. Only in the early 
Fleming26 case did the court back away from an extrinsic survivorship 
contract, and then primarily for the reason that enforcement of the agree-
ment would have prejudiced the Interests of a surviving spouse. 
In Stewart v. Todd, 21 a partnership agreement between husband and wife 
provided that "at the death of either party the one living shall fulfill all con-
tracts, pay all debts, and have all property left or owned by either party, or 
in the firm name., When the wife died devising her separate property in a 
manner inconsistent with the agreement, the court upheld the husband's 
survivorship claim. 
The deed to the property involved in Conlee v. Conlee28 expressly desig-
nated the grantee brothers as tenants in common. Subsequently the brothers 
entered into a written agreement that the survivor of them was to have the 
whole property. The court recognized the validity of the contract and found 
that it created a joint tenancy which controlled over the granting clause in 
the deed under which the brothers took the property. 
In Stonewall v. Danielson,20 the agreement to hold property as joint ten-
ants was oral and it was made prior to the acquistion of the property in issue. 
Without deciding whether the agreement created a true joint tenancy, the 
court sustained its validity and enforced the survivorship rights created 
thereby. 
This permissive attitude toward separate contracts is perhaps explainable 
25 226 Iowa 222, 284 N.W. 86 (1939). 
26 Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 174 N.W. 946 (1922). 
27190 Iowa 283, 173 N.W. 619 (1920). 
2 8 222 Iowa 561, 269 N.W. 259 (1937) 
20 204 Iowa 1367, 217 N.W. 456 (1928). 
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as a side-effect of the liberalization of the requirements for creation of joint 
tenancies in personalty. However explained, it is a disturbing matter to estate 
planners because it means that one cannot fully rely on an examination of 
title instrument to detect survivorship rights. The full magnitude of the uncer-
tainty becomes apparent with the fact that the survivorship agreement may 
be recognized even though it is oral and entered into prior to the acquisition 
of the property. The importance of a thorough inquiry into the client's 
unrecorded, and even unwritten arrangements concerning his property should 
be evident. 
CREATION-PERSONAL PROPERTY 
"Language which is sufficient to effectuate a joint tenancy in a deed will 
be equally so in personalty."30 This terse statement excerpted from a recent 
Iowa opinion is representative of the Iowa approach to joint tenancies in 
personalty permissive, yet not without boundaries. But the boundary lines 
are more indistinct than with realty. 
The principles developed in the preceding section concerning creation of 
a joint tenancy in real property are equally applicable to many items of 
personal property. But the kaleidoscopic array of personalty susceptible to 
joint ownership today suggests the impracticality of attempting to resolve all 
personalty survivorship problems by reference to real property principles. 
Generally, the less reliable the analogy to real property ownership, the less 
likely the applicable rules will reflect the common law heritage. 
Tangible personalty used in close association with real property is likely 
to be judged by the traditional property standards, and the statutory pre-
sumption of tenancy in common is likely to be applied. At the opposite 
extreme, in disputes involving such amorphous co-ownerships as joint bank 
accounts and government bonds, the legislative policy against survivorship 
may be held inapplicable and the issue decided through resort to contract or 
trust principles. It is helpful in discussing the personal property situation to 
isolate certain types of assets that frequently raise survivorship problems, 
including particularly tangible personalty, corporate stocks and bonds, joint 
bank accounts, joint safety deposit boxes, government bonds, and mortgages, 
land contracts, and other contractual rights. 
Tangible Personalty 
Surprisingly little law exists, both in Iowa and elsewhere, relating to re-
quirements for creating a joint tenancy in tangible personalty. It seems to be 
generally assumed that the creation of survivorship rights in tangibles is gov-
erned by the standard property requirements of transfer, delivery, and intent 
30 In re Estate of Miller, 248 Iowa 19, 22-23, 79 N.W.2d 315, 318 ( 1956). 
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to create a joint tenancy derived from real property law and that the pre-
sumption against survivorship applies. 3 1 
Such an assumption ignores somewhat the loose undocumented arrange-
ments that usually characterize the ownership of personal property. As a 
practical matter, this traditional casualness in the formation of personal prop-
erty ownership arrangements permits a great deal of latitude for resolving 
each co-ownership problem on its own peculiar facts and leaves little room 
for operation of the statutory presumption. In other words, the courts are 
much freer to rely on intent manifested in the parties declarations and conduct 
regarding the property than in the normal real property situation where the 
determination is focused on construction of a written conveyance.32 
Because of the milieu in which rights to personal property are held in Iowa, 
a common problem of much significance arising from the co-ownership of 
personalty is the disposition of tangibles used in connection with a jointly 
owned land. For example, when a husband and wife hold title to the family 
farm as joint tenants, should such items as the livestock, feed, and machinery 
be regarded as subject to the survivorship right, or are they the separate 
property of one person? A similar question may arise in regard to an informal 
father and son farm partnership. 
To date only one Iowa case is found that raises this issue in a farm con-
text. Considering the sizable number of Iowa farms held in joint tenancy, this 
lack of litigation is remarkable. Whether this dearth of authority means that 
the surviving joint tenant's claim to the farm personalty is never disputed or 
that such a claim is never made is subject to conjecture. The few farm joint 
tenancy cases decided in other jurisdictions shed very little light on the issue. 33 
In Conlee v. Conlee34 the survivorship agreement was spelled out in a 
written contract between two brothers who farmed as partners. In enforcing 
the survivorship contract, the court did not distinguish between the real and 
personal property involved in the farm business. However, the contract in 
issue specified a survivorship right in the farm personalty and was quite 
different in content and form from the usual joint tenancy deed to a farm. 
In final analysis, issues of this nature must be resolved on the basis of intent. 
In a husband and wife joint tenancy, the chances are very great that an 
intent will be found to extend the survivorship right to personal property 
closely associated with the land. In joint tenancies between others than hus-
band and wife, the intent is not so easily inferred from the parties' relation-
ship; therefore, the burden of the proving it may be substantially greater. 
3l See In re Estate of Miller, 248 Iowa 19, 79 N.W.2d 315 (1956); Conlee v. Conlee, 
222 Iowa 561, 269 N .W. 259 (1937). 
32 See O'Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412 (1943). 
33 See, e.g., Block v. Schmidt, 296 Mich. 610, 296 N.W. 698 ( 1941); In re Ebdon, 98 
N.Y.S.2d 697 (1950); Estate of Budney, 2 Wis. 2d 389, 86 N.W.2d 416 (1957). 
34 222 Iowa 561,269 N.W. 259 (1937). 
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Corporate Stocks and Bonds 
It is seemingly well settled in Iowa that joint tenancies may be created in 
corporate stocks and ordinary bonds by the same method as joint tenancies 
in land. The Iowa court has followed this property approach in two recent 
cases. In one case dealing with debentures payable to "John Miller or Robert 
Miller, either one or the survivor," the court said: 
"Since the right of joint tenancy in personal property as well as in real estate 
is recognized in Iowa, it follows that language which is sufficient to effectuate a 
joint tenancy in a deed should be equally so in personalty, such as stock certifi-
cates, bank accounts, or the debentures involved in the case at bar. "35 
The reliance on a property rather than a contract rationale was made clear 
by the statement: "The general rule is ... that any instrument, whether per-
taining to realty or personalty, in which two or more persons are grantees, or 
payees, creates in them a tenancy in common in the absence of expression of 
a contrary intent. "36 
In a later decision construing the effect of a stock certificate made to hus-
band and wife "as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants 
in common" the court reaffirmed its recognition of the joint tenancy estate 
in corporate stock. 37 The court recognized the trend to search for intent in 
joint tenancy cases, but noted that such a policy "does not permit the courts 
to completely remake written instruments after death and insanity have sealed 
the lips of the principals." In commenting on the creating language the court 
said, "No words more clear, explicit, free from misunderstanding nor tech-
nically correct could be used." 
These cases approve the creation of joint tenancies in stocks and bonds 
through insertion of the classic language in the stock certificate, but they do 
not exclude other possibilities for creating survivorship rights in such property. 
By an analogy to real estate law, survivorship rights could be created also 
through a separate contract between the parties. 38 The contract theory devel-
oped in bank deposit cases discussed subsequently might lead to the conclu-
sion that an appropriate contract between the registered owners and the corpo-
ration issuing the stock would constitute a sufficient survivorship agreement. 39 
It is sometimes suggested that insofar as listed stocks are concerned, the 
stock exchange rules must be followed to create a joint tenancy. 40 This may 
be true with regard to the validity of the arrangement vis a vis the exchange 
and the corporation's transfer agent, but it should not prevent the parties 
35 In re Estate of Miller, 248 Iowa 19, 22-23, 79 N.W.2d 315, 318 ( 1956). 
36 /d. at 22, 79 N.W. 2d at 318. 
37 Hyland v. Standiford, 253 Iowa 294, Ill N.W.2d 260 (1961). 
38 See notes 26-29 supra, and accompanying text. 
39 See notes 41-49 infra, and accompanying text. 
4 0 See Christy and McLean, The Transfer of Stock. § 220 (2d ed. 1940). 
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creating survivorship arrangements that are binding on themselves and their 
estates. 
Joint Bank Accounts 
"The increasing use of joint bank accounts makes the problem before us 
one of general importance. The fact that upon the death of the husband a sum 
is at once available to discharge the expenses of the last illness and provide 
for household necessities, without Court proceedings, has won for such 
accounts increasing favor. In fact, these accounts are regarded by people in 
modest circumstances as a poor man's will. "41 
As the above quotation would imply, survivorship provisions in joint bank 
accounts have generally been given effect in Iowa. However, the court experi-
mented with a number of rationales before arriving at the current "contract" 
theory for enforcing such provisions. 4 2 Starting with the Winkler case43 in 
1942, the court has recognized that the description of the joint bank account 
as creating a "joint tenancy" is generic and does not require application of 
the property principles usually associated with the term. 
The contract theory proceeds in the assumption (equally supported by the 
real property cases) that there is no policy of the state which prevents persons 
from creating survivorship rights in their property through a valid contract. 
The court in O'Brien v. Biegger noted: "There is no legislative or judicial ban 
against agreements for joint tenancies in any kind of property," and later 
took pains to point out that Iowa Code Section 528.64 might be regarded 
as indicating a legislative policy in favor of survivorship in joint accounts by 
authorizing banks to pay out to any person named in an account "payable to 
either or the survivor."44 
The contract upon which the theory is based is the deposit agreement 
between the bank and the depositors. The development of the contract theory 
and its conceptual foundation is lucidly set forth in Hills v. Havens. 45 In sus-
taining the survivorship arrangement created by a Signature Card denomi-
nated as a "Joint Account Payable to Either or Survivor" and containing the 
typical language, the court said: 
"The contract is that the bank will , in consideration of the deposit of funds 
with it and the creation of a debtor-creditor relation between itself and its 
depositors, consider them as owners in joint tenancy, with right of survivorship, 
and not as tenants in common; and that upon the death of either depositor any 
41 O'Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 1189-90, 11 N.W.2d 412,417 (1943). 
42 See Fitzgibbons, Joint Tenancy in Iowa, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 41 ( 1948); Note, 42 Iowa 
L. Rev. 551 ( 1957). 
4 3 In re Estate of Winkler, 232 Iowa 930, 5 N.W.2d 585 ( 1942). 
44 0'Brienv. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179,1205, 11 N.W. 2d 412,424 (1943); See also 
Iowa Code §§534.11 (5) & (8) (1962). 
45242 Iowa 920,48 N.W.2d 870 (1951). 
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balance in the account shall become the absolute property of the survivor. Lan-
guage more definite, more explicit, could hardly be devised."4 6 
Consistent with contract principles, where the provisions of the contract are 
clear, parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of the agreement.47 
But where the contract of deposit is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admis-
sible to show intent or lack of intent to create survivorship rights.48 Evidence 
of intent is likewise admissible where there is no written instrument relied 
upon to prove the survivorship agreement. 49 
Estate of Murdoch50 interjected a troublesome qualification on the contract 
theory by its refusal to enforce a deposit agreement providing for survivor-
ship where the survivor had not signed the deposit card. The decision was 
based on the ground that no valid contract has been entered into between the 
non-signatory survivor and the bank. It is not clear why, in absence of fraud, 
the agreement between the depositor and the bank would not, under contract 
principles, be enforceable by the survivor on a third-party beneficiary theory. 51 
Such a contract was enforced in a similar situation in Estate of Lenders, 52 
but no argument was made concerning execution of the deposit contract. 
Another unusual qualification that deserves comment is the presumption 
against the validity of the arrangement that is raised by a confidential rela-
tionship between the joint depositors. Such a presumption places on the 
survivor the burden of proving the fairness of the survivorship agreement by 
clear and convincing evidence. 53 
Joint Safety Deposit Boxes 
A problem that may be ripe for litigation in Iowa is the ownership of prop-
erty contained in a joint safety deposit box. Where the rental contract for the 
box specifies that only joint access is intended, it seems clear that ownership 
of the contents is in no way affected. However, rental agreements are occa-
sionally found that speak in terms of creating a survivorship interest in the 
assets stored within the box. This practice is quite disturbing considering the 
46 /d. at 929-30, 48 N.W.2d at 876. 
47 Burns v. Nemo, 252 Iowa 306, 315, 105 N.W.2d 217, 221 (1960); McManus v. Keo-
kuk Savings Bank & Trust Co., 239 Iowa 1105, 1109, 33 N.W.2d 410, 412 (1948); 
In re Estate of Murdoch, 238 Iowa 898, 903, 29 N.W.2d 177, 179 {1947). 
48 Williams v. Williams, 251 Iowa 260, 100 N.W.2d 185 (1959L In re Estate of Louden, 
249 Iowa 1393, 92 NW.2d 409 (1958); Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W.2d 
870 (1951). 
49See O'Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412 (1943). 
50 238 Iowa 898, 29 N.W.2d 177 ( 1947). 
51 Cf. Marble Savings Bank v. Mesarvey, 101 Iowa 285, 70 N.W. 198 (1897). 
52 247 Iowa 1205, 78 N.W.2d 536 (1956). 
53 See Burns v. Nemo, 252 Iowa 306, 105 N.W.2d 217 (1960); Luse v. Grenko, 251 
Iowa 211, 100 N .W.2d 170 (1959). 
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extent to which the Iowa court has generally endorsed contracts creating 
survivorship rights. 
There is no Iowa authority on the issue, but if the court were to give effect 
to such an agreement, it is arguable that every item placed in the box would 
become subject to survivorship rights. In such a case would removal of the 
property from the box then terminate the survivorship right? It is difficult to 
imagine a situation more fraught with litigious uncertainties. 
Creation of such fluid ownership rights has found little acceptance in other 
jurisdictions. 54 At least where the agreement is ambiguous, the decisions re-
solve the issue in favor of a joint access construction. 55 
Government Bonds 
The Iowa treatment of survivorship rights in government bonds has closely 
paralleled developments in the area of joint bank accounts. In fact, in Hill v. 
Havens the court said: 
"We have discussed and determined the proper ruling as to the bank deposit in 
the preceding division. We think the reasoning and precedents require a similar 
holding in regard to the United States Bonds."56 
It now seems well settled that the contract theory is fully applicable to 
government bonds, and with fewer limitations than are applied to joint bank 
accounts because the "contract" is said to incorporate by reference the United 
States Treasury Regulations. 57 
The applicable regulations read as follows: 
"§315.60 A savings bond registered in co-ownership form, for example, "John 
A. Jones or Mrs. Mary C. Jones" will be paid . . . during the Jives of both, as 
follows: (a) Payment. The bond will be paid to either upon his separate request, 
and upon payment to him the other shall cease to h ave any interest in the bond. 
.. "§315.61 After death of one ... co-owner. If either co-owner dies without the 
bond having been presented and surrendered for payment or authorized reissue, 
the survivor will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner. Thereafter, pay-
ment or reissue will be made as though the bond were registered in the name of 
the survivor alone .... "58 
Apparently feeling the need to make amends for earlier slights, the court 
in Estate of Sprague59 stretched the "contract with the government" concept 
to the point of construing a will provision devising property received "as a 
G-t See Effland, Estate Planning : Co-ownership, Seminar Series for Wisconsin Lawyers 
38, Sept. 11, 1957. 
55 Calif. Trust Co. v. Bennett, 33 Cal.2d 694, 204 P.2d 324 ( 1949) ; David v. Ridfely-
Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 Ill. App. 96, 95 N.E.2d 725 ( 1950); See also Lilly v. 
Schmock, 297 Mich. 513, 298 N.W. 116 (1941). 
t5G242 Iowa 920,930-31,48 N.W.2d 870, 876 (1951). 
57 Id. at 932, 48 N.W.2d at 877. 
css Title 31, Code of Fed. Regs. (Revised 1965). 
59 244 Iowa 540, 57 N.W.2d 212 (1953). 
-13-
surviving spouse from my husband" to exclude bonds taken by the textatrix 
as a surviving joint tenant with her husband. 
Mortgages, Land Contracts, and other Contractual Rights 
Both a real estate mortgage and a land contract are essentially contractual 
obligations secured by a lien on real estate. True, the security interests may 
be enforced through different remedies, 00 still both are essentially land-based 
credit arrangements. To create a survivorship interest in the proceeds owing 
under such instruments, must one adhere to the property principles or is the 
contract theory available to permit proof of an extrinsic intent? This problem 
is particularly sensitive in Iowa owing to the rule that a contract of sale by 
all joint tenants severs the joint tenancy. 01 
Very little authority is found on this point in Iowa or elsewhere. The im-
plication of Estate of Baker62 is that to create a joint tenancy in the proceeds 
of a land contract, compliance with the usual property requirements is neces-
sary. It would appear the statutory presumption in favor of tenancies in com-
mon would be applicable. By analogy, the same should be true of mortgage 
proceeds, although a distinction apparently is drawn between the contract 
and mortgage on the question of severance. 03 In Estate of Miller, 04 where the 
court was discussing applicability of the statutory presumption to personal 
property, the language used was "grantees or payees." Thus, it seems safe to 
predict that the creation of joint tenancy in the interests of real estate mort-
gagees and land contract vendors will require the same general precautions 
as would the creation of joint tenancy in the real property itself. 
Unsecured contractual obligations and debts secured by chattel interests 
arguably could be subjected to survivorship arrangements in the same fashion 
as joint bank accounts. Chances are, however, that ordinary contract rights 
jointly owned will not receive the same favored treatment as joint bank ac-
counts and government bonds, 65 so the sound practice is to specify the sur-
vivorship interest clearly in the contract. 
SEVERANCE 
Once the estate planner has satisfied himself that a survivorship right was 
validly created in the property, he still is not in a position to make a final 
judgment concerning the extant form of ownership until he has ascertained 
60 Compare Iowa Code c. 654 with c. 656 ( 1962) . 
61 See In re Baker's Estate, 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 ( 1956); In re Sprague's 
Estate, 244 Iowa 450, 57 N.W.2d 212 (1953). 
02 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 ( 1956). 
63 See notes 72-78 and accompanying text. 
64 248 Iowa 19, 79 N.W.2d 315 (1956). 
65 The "payees" language of In re Estate of Mi11er would seem to apply equally to 
ordinary contract obligees. 
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that the joint tenancy was not subsequently severed. The variety of methods 
by which a joint tenancy may be terminated is often cited as proof of the 
instability of the relationship. This allegation is not wholly fair because it 
implies that there is considerable danger of an unintentional severance occur-
ring-a state of affairs that the cases simply do not support. 
In Iowa the emphasis on intent, which now characterizes the resolution of 
issues involving joint tenancy creation, has not been accompanied by a similar 
shift in the attitude toward severance. 66 Today, references to the "four unities" 
are most frequently found in cases dealing with termination questions. Gen-
erally, an effective termination requires an intent to sever plus a deliberate 
act inconsistent with the continuance of the survivorship right-intent alone 
is not sufficient. As with creation problems, the nature of the property sub-
jected to the survivorship rights affects the formality of the act required to 
effect termination. For example, where tangible personalty is involved, it is 
often not clear whether certain conduct toward the property rebutts the exist-
ence of survivorship rights or severs a validly created joint tenancy; and in 
most such cases the distinction is not really important. 
The discussion of severance law has been divided into a number of prob-
lem areas. It is not certain that all possibilities have been covered, but a 
substantial start has been made on the list. 
Partition 
Partition is the most formal method of severing joint tenancy and little ques-
tion can exist concerning its effectiveness in Iowa. 67 However, the tenancy is 
probably not severed until the partition judgment is rendered, although it 
could be argued that commencment of the action is an act clearly manifesting 
an intent to sever . 
Mutual Agreement 
If joint tenancy can be created by contract, logically it should be severable 
by the same method. The Iowa court has never been squarely faced with the 
issue, but has indicated in dicta that it would recognize a mutual agreement 
as effecting a severance. 68 In Estate of Baker, 60 the court quotes extensively 
a passage from Blackstone's Commentaries supporting the effectiveness of a 
mutual agreement to sever. 
Conveyance 
The joint tenancy relationship does not preclude a unilateral transfer of a 
co-tenant's undivided interest or a joint transfer of the property by all the 
6G See Fitzgibbons, Joint Tenancy in Iowa, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 41 ( 1948). 
GT See Indra v. Wiggins, 238 Iowa 728, 28 N.W.2d 485 ( 1947). 
68 Wood v. Logue, 167 Iowa 436, 171 N .W. 290 (1914). 
Go 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 ( 1956). 
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co-tenants. The effect of such a conveyance by one joint tenant is to sever 
the joint tenancy as to the interest transferred.70 If there are more than two 
co-tenants, the conveyance of one undivided interest usually does not affect 
the relationship of the remaining joint tenants inter se. A deed by one spouse 
in husband and wife joint tenancy of homestead property would not cause a 
severance because such a deed is void under Section 5 61.13 of the Iowa 
Code. 71 
Contract of Sale .. 
An enforceable contract to sell his undivided interest entered into by one 
joint tenant ordinarily severs the joint tenancy. Under the doctrine of equit-
able conversion, the unity of title clearly would be broken. 72 
In Iowa, a contract to sell joint tenancy property by all co-tenants was 
held in Estate of Baker1 3 to sever the joint tenancy unless the contract spe-
cifically provides that the proceeds are to be received in joint tenancy. The 
rationale of this decision was primarily in terms of the destruction of the 
four unities and the statutory presumption against joint tenancies. 
The Baker case was decided by a 5-4 majority and has been criticized as 
creating an opportunity for an unintentional severance through insistence on 
anachronistic technical rules74 and defended as creating a parity between real 
estate credit arrangements different in form only. 7 5 One t\vist to the Baker 
rule that should be recognized is that the subsequent forfeiture of the buyer's 
interest and restoration of the full title to the sellers would not restore a 
joint tenancy relationship where the contract failed to provide for the receipt 
of the proceeds as joint tenancy property. 
The effect of the Baker rule on contracts to sell personal property is spec-
ulative. The result will probably depend on the closeness of the analogy of the 
personalty sold to real property. 
Mortgage and Pledge 
Although there is no direct Iowa authority, and the cases in which the 
question has been obliquely involved suggest conflicting results, 76 it is gen-
70 See In re Heckman's Estate, 228 Iowa 967, 291 N .W. 465 (1940). 
71 "No conveyance or encumbrance of, or contract to convey or encumber the home-
stead, if the owner is married, is valid unless the husband and wife join in the ex-
ecution of the same joint instrument ... " Iowa Code § 561.13 (1962). 
72 In re Estate of Sprague, 244 Iowa 540, 57 N.W.2d 212 ( 1953). 
73 247 Iowa 1380,78 N .W.2d 863 (1956). 
74Comment, 42IowaL. Rev. 646 (1957). 
75 See Marshall, Iowa Title Opinions and Standards § 3.2(j) ( 1963). 
76 See, e.g., Hyland v. Standiford, 253 Iowa 294, 111 N.W.2d 260 ( 1961) ; Indra v. 
Wiggins, 238 Iowa 728, 28 N .W.2d 485 ( 1947) ; In re Estate of Heckman, 228 Iowa 
967, 291 N.W. 465 (1940). 
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erally believed that in a "lien" jurisdiction like Iowa, a mortgage by one or 
all joint tenants does not cause a severance of the joint tenancy.77 Although 
this result would likely square with the intent of the parties, it is somewhat 
difficult to reconcile with the four unities concept-the interest of the joint 
tenants does change to an equity of redemption.7 8 Of course, a transfer of 
the joint tenancy property or an interest therein at a foreclosure sale will 
cause a severance. 
In Hyland v. Standiford70 a pledge of stock was expressly held not to sever 
the survivorship right where no further alienation or foreclosure took place. 
Judgment Liens 
Most jurisdictions recognize that a joint tenant's undivided interest in real 
property is subject to the claim of his creditors, but it is generally held that a 
severance is not effected until the interest is actually sold at execution sale. 80 
Although there is no Iowa authority on the point, it is commonly believed 
that neither the perfecting of a judgment lien nor a non-possessary levy will 
(without more) cause a severance. 8l 
Special Limitation 
In Iowa a joint tenancy may be automatically severed upon the occurrence 
of an event upon which the estate was conditioned. The Iowa court has held 
that a forfeiture provision to take effect in the event of the marriage of a 
grantee was not inconsistent with the estate of joint tenancy. 82 The court 
stated that: 
" ... the objection is sufficiently answered by the suggestion that this provtsion 
does no more than provide for a contingency upon the happening of which the 
joint tenancy should cease. "83 
Effect of a Lease 
At common law, a lease for years by one joint tenant constituted a valid 
severance of the tenancy so long as the lease continued, and it took prece-
dence over the right of survivorship in the other joint tenants. 84 Some author-
ities today argue that a total severance should take place because a destruc-
77 See Marshall, Iowa Title Opinions and Standards § 4.11 (1963) Note, 41 Iowa L. 
Rev. 425 (1956). 
78 See 2 American Law of Property § 6.2 (Casner ed 1952). 
7D 253 Iowa 294, 111 N.W.2d 260 (1961). 
HO See Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 ( 1945); Musa v. Scgclke & 
Kohlnaus Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657 (1957). 
8 1 See Marshall, Iowa Title Opinions and Standards, § 10.6 (B) ( 1963). 
82 See Wood v. Logue, 167 Iowa 436, 149 N.W. 613 (1914). 
8.i Id. at 441, 149 NW. at 615. 
8 4 See generally Littleton's Tenures§ 289, Co. Litt *185a, *186b. 
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tion of the unity of interest occurs. Others hold the view that the lease severs 
the tenancy but it can be revived if the lease terminates, prior to the death 
of the leasor. A third vie\v suggests that no severance occurs and the survivor 
takes the entire estate subject to the rights of the leasee. 85 This latter posi-
tion seems most consistent with modern joint tenancy concepts. The Iowa 
court has never been faced with the issue. 
Acquisition of an Adverse Interest 
In an early case the Iowa court recognized that a tenant in common cannot 
defeat the rights of his co-tenant by permitting the property taxes to become 
dehnquent and then purchasing the property at a tax sale. 86 Whether such 
a rule would be extended to preclude the effectiveness of such an act to cause 
the severance of a joint tenancy is not clear. 
Presumably a joint tenancy may be severed by the adverse possession of 
one tenant against another where there has been an ouster. The Iowa court 
has not been directly confronted with the question, but in Lynch v. Lynch, 87 
one tenant in common was permitted to claim the share of the other through 
adverse possession. 
Bankruptcy 
A strong argument could be made for the proposition that bankruptcy of 
a joint tenant severs the joint tenancy automatically. 88 In any event it seems 
clear that a trustee in bankruptcy has the poVYer to sever the joint estate for 
the benefit of creditors of the bankrupt. The trustee is vested with all interests 
owned by the bankrupt and is charged with the duty of marshalling and 
selling the assets in order to distribute the proceeds. 8n Thus, it would logically 
follow that acts done in such capacity vvould effect a severance, if such were 
the legal consequence of the same acts had they been done by the bankrupt 
joint tenant himself. 
Disposition by Will 
A disposition of joint tenancy property by will generally has no effect 
because the testator's interest disappears at the instant of his death. This prop-
osition has been consistently recognized in the Iowa cases. no 
In a few jurisdictions a doctrine of election has grown up in cases where 
property held in a husband and wife joint tenancy is devised away by the first 
85 See 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 425 (3d ed 1939). 
86 Weaver v. Van Meter, 42 Iowa 128, 20 Amer. Rep. 616 (1875). 
87239 Iowa 1245,34 N.W.2d 485 (1948). 
88 The unity of title would seem to be broken immediately on appointment of the trustee. 
sn Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S C.A. § 7 5 ( 1965). 
no See, e.g., Wernet v. Jurgenson, 241 Iowa 833, 43 N.W.2d 194 ( 1950). 
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to die in a will which the survivor accepts. 91 In substance this doctrine holds 
that the acceptance by the survivor of the will containing a disposition incon-
sistent with the joint tenancy effects an election against the survivorship 
right. The Iowa court has not indicated any responsiveness to such a rule. 
However, Iowa does recognize the po\ver of joint tenants to limit the extent 
of the survivorship right through a subsequent contractual will. Thus, it has 
been held recently that a contractual will impressed a constructive trust on 
property taken by the surviving joint tenant in favor of the devisees in the 
will. 92 In enforcing the provision in such a will against a surviving joint ten-
ant in Jennings v McKeen,93 the court remarked: "That the survivor may 
become owner by virtue of the joint tenancy is immaterial so long as she 
received benefits under the will sufficient to constitute consideration to sup-
port the contract." It is interesting to note that the Eighth Circuit found the 
Iowa law to preclude the limitation of joint tenancy property through a con-
tractual will in a 1955 case involving the availability of the estate tax marital 
deduction. 94 
Divorce 
The general rule seen1s to be that absent a property settlement affecting 
the joint tenancy relationship, divorce of married joint tenants does not cause 
a severance. 95 Such a result seems contrary to the intent of at least one of the 
co-tenants. Iowa has not had occasion to examine the question directly.96 
Shnultaneous Death 
In a sense, the simultaneous death of all joint tenants effects a severance 
through the provision of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. 97 Under that 
Act the jointly owned property is distributed as if each joint tenant survived 
as to his proportionate interest in the property. 
91 See, e g., Estate of Parker, 223 Wts. 29, 76 N.W.2d 712 ( 1956). 
92 Tiemann v. Kampmeier, 252 Iowa 587, 107 N.W.2d 689 ( 1961). 
03 245 Iowa 1206, 65 N W.2d 207 ( 1954). 
9-t Awtry v. Comm'r, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955) . 
95 This rule emphasizes the degree to which intent is disregarded in the rather blind 
allegiance to the common law unities demonstrated by severance principles. 
9G In lndra v. Wiggins the court casually approved a lower court finding of law that a 
divotced couple were still '"Joint tenants'' 238 Iowa 728, 38 N.W.2d 485 (1947). 
0 7 Uniform Simultaneous Death Act § 3; Iowa Code Ann. § 633.525 (1964). 
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CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DECISION TO PRESERVE OR 
SEVER JOINT TENANCY 
When it has been determined that the estate contains assets currently sub-
ject to valid survivorship rights, the estate planner must next turn his attention 
to weighing the advantages and disadvantages to the estate of preserving or 
severing particular joint tenancy relationships. In this evaluative process dif-
ferent types of considerations must be recognized and balanced against one 
another. 
Generalizations concerning the \Veighting of various factors are of little 
value because the relative significance of each consideration is singularly de-
pendent on the peculiar facts of each case the size and composition of the 
estate, the relationships, needs, and abilities of family members, and the 
client's personal objectives. It should be helpful, however, to note here the 
factors commonly associated with the evaluation of joint tenancies. At this 
stage, the taxation material is segregated in an effort to minimize confusion. 
Tax considerations are merged with other factors in the later sections where 
specific problems are developed. 
HUMAN FACTORS 
The individual personalities and feelings of the joint tenant and his family 
are considerations that cannot be ignored. The spiritual aspects of joint ten-
ancy are often debunked; nevertheless, in many cases it may be that the 
sense of security and feeling of involvement in the family's affairs generated 
by joint tenancy holdings run so deep that they override any other considera-
tions. 
At a slightly different level, family members may habitually own their , 
property in joint tenancy and be unwilling to deviate from the established 
pattern. Or it may be that the joint ownership is simply a matter of conveni-
ence and is preferred for that reason. In such situations these personal prefer-
ences might be expected to yield upon a showing of significant advantage or 
disadvantage on other counts. 
Although hardly consistent with good estate planning practice, the reluc-
tance of many persons with modest estates to make wills is firmly entrenched. 
Situations are conceivable where the results within the family under joint 
tenancy survivorship are preferable to those that would obtain in intestacy. 
For example, between a husband and wife with no children or with minor 
children, survivorship to the entire property by the wife under joint tenancy 
would likely be more nearly consistent with the best interests of the family 
than would be the division of the estate required by the intestate la\VS. 
Of course, the personal aspects of the situation may also militate against 
continuation of the joint tenancy. Where one of the joint tenants is a spend-
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thrift or does not possess the managerial ability to handle the property as 
survivor, a change in ownership form is indicated. Likewise, if extensive use 
of joint tenancy channels the bulk of the estate to one member of the family, 
the probability of creating a rift between the survivor and the rest of the 
family might suggest termination of the survivorship feature. 
Also it should be kept in mind that joint tenancies are readily severable 
and that the trust reposed in a person today may be proved unsound by 
future events. Once a joint tenancy has been created, the most the creating 
tenant can get back without the consent of the other tenants is his proportion-
ate share. 98 The other tenants have equal rights to sever the joint tenancy 
and take their share, and their creditors can also reach the property. 99 
Full realization of the legal implications of the survivorship right is required 
before the client can fully appreciate the effect on the family situation. Many 
people, for example, fail to understand that joint tenancy property can not 
be validly disposed of by an ordinary will. Thus, the man married to his 
second wife may be surprised to learn that he cannot continue the joint 
tenancy with his wife and still effectively \vill his interest in the property to 
his children by the earlier marriage. Likewise, the farmer holding the family 
farm in joint tenancy with his wife is alarmed to discover that on his death 
no part of the farm will go to the son with whom he farms in partnership. 
PROPERTY LAW 
Two of the principle advantages enjoyed by the joint tenancy relationship 
are attributable to the peculiar position the survivorship right occupies in the 
property law. As explained earlier, conceptually, a surviving joint tenant takes 
his interest not from the deceased joint tenant, but through the original con-
veyance.100 The deceased tenant's interest is simply destroyed by his death . 
Thus it is clear in Iowa for example, that ownership may be transferred 
at death through a survivorship arrangement without the time, trouble, and 
expense of estate administration. In the case of real property, the survivor 
may perfect a marketable title relatively easily through a showing of the other 
tenant's death and non-liability of the property for death taxes.101 A surviving 
joint bank account depositor may withdraw the entire account without making 
any showing regarding the other depositor's death.102 In small estates this 
98 See Wernet v. Jurgenson, 241 Iowa 833, 43 N .W.2d 194 (1950); 4 Thompson on 
Real Property § 1780 (1961). 
9!>See generally 2 Tiffany, Real Property§ 425 (3d ed. 1955). 
lOO See Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 174 N.W. 946 (1922). 
IOl Iowa Land Title Standard 44 (3d ed. 1955). 
102 Iowa Code § 528.64 ( 1962). The recent change in the Iowa Inheritance Tax Law 
requires the bank to give notice of the account balance on the date of decedent's 
death to the Tax Commission before releasing funds to the survivor. H.F. 679, 61st 
G.A. (1965). See also Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920,48 NW.2d 870 (1951). 
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ability to quickly and inexpensively obtain control over the property has real 
value. In larger estates where administration is likely to be required anyway, 
the possibility of rapid realization of the survivor's interest loses much of its 
importance. 
Another advantage that is granted to the surviving joint tenant by Iowa 
law is the right to take the joint tenancy property free and clear of the debts 
of the deceased tenant. Again under the survivorship concept of joint ten-
ancy, unsecured creditors, judgment creditors, and even mortgagees who have 
claims against only the deceased joint tenant cannot reach the joint tenancy 
property in the hands of the survivors.103 This state of affairs may seem some-
what unfair to creditors, but the Iowa position seems clearly to be that the 
creditor who is not alert enough to protect himself in this respect is just 
out of luck. 
An additional advantage of the joint tenancy in some cases may be the 
avoidance of fractionalized interests possible through survivorship. Good rea-
sons may exist for trying to keep certain property together as a unit, i.e. a 
family farm. It should be recognized that joint tenancy cannot guarantee free-
dom from division as any joint tenant has the power to sever the relationship. 
On the debit side, the property law aspects of joint tenancy limit its useful-
ness in several ways. For one thing the joint tenancy relationship is subject to 
great uncertainties. The complexities of creating and preserving the survivor-
ship rights have been discussed in detail earlier. An interest based on such a 
complicated set of rules is highly susceptible to disputes, a good percentage 
of which may lead to litigation. A joint tenancy is not a very promising sub-
stitute for a will if it is likely to cause dissention within the family and 
precipitate an expensive law suit. 
A second serious disadvantage of the joint tenancy in today's rapidly 
changing world is its inherent inflexibility in comparison to an estate planning 
tool like the trust. The placing of property in joint tenancy may somewhat 
assure the passage of title to the survivor, but no provision can be made for 
the myriad changes in the family situation that might require a different 
temporary or permanent use of the asset. No assurance of competent manage-
ment is available through joint tenancy. There is no simple procedure for 
responding to the special needs of minors or other dependents. In the husband 
and wife joint tenancy, no possibility exists for avoiding death taxes through 
the life estate-remainder device. There is no method for preventing an im-
mediate realization on his interest by a spendthrift, and no way of assuring 
that the ownership of the whole property may be restored to the tenant pro-
viding the original consideration for it if the other tenants become incom-
103 See Wood v. Logue, 167 Iowa 436, 149 N.\V. 613 (1914); Marshall, Iowa Title Opin-
ions and Standards § 10.6 (A) ( 1963). 
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petent, insolvent, or undeserving. All of these results, and others, are readily 
obtainable through judicious use of the trust. 
The division of ownership incident to a joint tenancy may cause difficulties 
that are not present in separate ownership. Each tenant has equal rights to use 
and possess the property and is entitled to share equally in its income. 1 04 
It is easy to see that where tangible personalty, e.g. a registered bull, is the 
subject of the joint tenancy, these rights could cause problems. The right of 
each joint tenant to sever the relationship and take out his undivided interest 
could also be troublesome in such a case. In joint bank accounts and govern-
ment bonds one joint tenant has the right under the contract to appropriate 
the entire property to his own use, either by withdrawing the balance of the 
bank account or cashing in the bonds.1o5 Protection against this eventuality 
lies chiefly in safeguarding the possession of the pass book or bonds. 
Additional difficulties that may arise through use of the joint tenancy 
include the simultaneous death of the joint tenants and the danger that the 
estate will lack necessary liquidity. Both of these matters are discussed else-
where and need not be covered in detail here. 
TAXATION 
Bear in mind that this monograph proceeds on the assumption that a joint 
tenancy is already in existence, therefore the tax rules of primary significance 
are those concerning termination of the relationship by severance or death and 
the income taxation of co-ownerships subject to survivorship rights. The fol-
lowing discussion is fairly elementary and is intended to indicate only the 
general principles involved. Particular application of these principles is left 
.. to the subsequent chapters where the problems of severance and integration 
are developed more fully. 
Taxation on Death 
From the standpoint of planning to minimize death taxes, the biggest single 
deficiency of the joint tenancy is its preclusion of any use of the life interest-
remainder technique to avoid death taxation twice in one generation or to 
skip a generation of death taxes. When property is held in joint tenancy the 
likelihood is that all or a substantial part of it will be taxed in the estate of 
the first to die and it will also be fully taxed in the estate of the survivor. In 
husband and wife joint tenancies, the availability of the marital deduction 
1 04 See Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 174 N.W 946 (1922). 
lO:i See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text. 
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may mean that the property is taxed only one ond one-half times in one 
generation.106 
When property is owned separately, it will be fully taxed in the estate of 
the owner, 107 but either during his lifetime or through his will he may trans-
fer all or a portion of property in trust to pay income to his wife, children, or 
other dependents for their life with the remainder interest going to others in 
the family. By this technique the income value of the property is made avail-
able to designated persons without incurring a diminution of the property by 
death taxes on the passage of the estate from such persons down to the next 
generation. to & In the husband and wife situation the use of the two-trusts will 
is such standard practice that it hardly deserves elaboration here. 109 When 
compared to the tax planning possibilities of life interest-remainder arrange-
ments, it is apparent that the joint tenancy may cause an unnecessary deple-
tion of the estate through cumulative death taxes. 
Federal Estate Tax 
Under section 2040 of the Internal Revenue Code the general rule is that 
the total value of joint tenancy property is included in the gross estate of the 
joint owner who dies first unless it can be affirmatively proved that the prop-
erty was not acquired entirely with consideration furnished by the decedent 
or was acquired by the decedent and other joint ovvner or owners by gift, 
bequest, devise, or inheritance.110 Included under this section are joint ten-
ancies of both real and personal property, joint bank accounts, and all like 
interests in property .111 Where the property is held by owners as tenants in 
common, only the decedent's fractional interest is included.112 
Thus, if a husband purchases a residence and title is placed in joint tenancy 
with his wife, the entire value of the residence, as of the date of his death, 
or one year later if the optional valuation date is used, 113 would be included • 
in the husband's gross estate.114 But if the wife instead of the husband were 
lOG To explain, even if fully included in the estate of the first to die, other things being 
equal, the marital deduction will result in a taxing of only one-half the property. 
When the surviving tenant dtes owning the whole property it will all be included in 
her estate. 
107 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2033, Reg. Treas. 20 2033- 1. 
108 The value of a decedent's gross estate includes the value, at the time of his death, 
of all property. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2031. Since the value of the decedent's life 
estate at the time of death is zero, none of the property producing the income is 
included in decedent's gross estate. 
1 on See Iowa Probate Practice Manual 8J ( 1965); Cusack and Snee, Principles and 
Practice of Estate Planning 28 1 ( 1959). 
llOTreas. Reg.§ 20.2040- l {a)(2). 
111 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1. 
1 1 2 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2033; Treac;. Reg. 20.2033-1 20.2040-1 (b). 
11 a Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2032. 
lt-t Treas. Reg § 20.2040-l{c){ l ). 
-24-
" 
to die first, nothing would be included in her estate assun1ing the husband 
could prove that he furni bed the entire purchase price.115 If the husband 
and wife received the residence by gift or inheritance and title was held in 
joint tenancy, only one-half the value of the residence would be included in 
the husband's gross estate.11 a 
The effect of Section 2040 is to place the burden on the taxpayer to prove 
that part of the consideration was not furnished by the decedent. It may be a 
very difficult to sustain this burden of proof where both spouses, or joint 
owners other than husband and wife, have independent estates or earnings. 
Accurate records may be required to show exactly from where the considera-
tion used to purchase the joint tenancy property originally came. For example, 
it is not sufficient to prove that the property was purchased with funds from 
a joint bank account. The question is the original source of the consideration 
-who put the money into the joint account. 117 Not even a prior gift of part 
of the consideration to the other joint tenant on which a gift tax was paid 
is effective to prevent inclusion of the joint tenancy property in the estate of 
the donor joint tenant. u s 
Services of a wife may constitute adequate consideration for her share in 
joint tenancy property if the wife actively rendered these services to the fam-
ily business and the income from the business was used to purchase joint 
tenancy property. H owever, generally it must be shown that there was a 
contractual agreement under which the wife was to share in the profits.119 
One of the difficulties where there is no formal contractual agreement is that 
generally the husband has a right to the services of the wife under state law, 
with no obligation to compensate her.120 
Although primary estate tax concern is with Section 2040, certain lifetime 
transfers terminating the joint tenancy relationship may have estate tax con-
sequences. Where the terminating transfer is for less than full value and takes 
place within three years of death, a gift in contemplation of death may be 
found under Section 2035. If in the transfer of a joint tenant's interest, a life 
estate in the property is retained, the property may be included in his estate 
under Section 2036. In both of the situations, the tax authorities are likely to 
attempt to include in the gross estate the total property formerly held as a 
115 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1 (c) (2). 
116 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1 (c) (7). 
117 Elwood Mead, P-H BTAM 42,236. Cf. Herbert D. Robinson, 21 B.T.A. 1373 
(1931), aff'd 63 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1932) cert. denied 289 U.S. 758 ( 1933). 
118 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1 (c) ( 4). 
119 This requirement was satisfied although there was no formal partnership agreement, 
when husband and wife considered themselves equal partners from the time the wife 
became active in the businec;c;. See Singer v. Shaughuessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d C1r. 
1952). 
1 20 See Bushman v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 694 (Ct. c. 1934). 
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joint tenant to the extent it would have been included if the transfer had not 
been made. These problems ate discussed in detail in a subsequent section.12 1 
To keep in perspective the significance of the estate tax it should be re-
membered that the tax applies only to taxable estates in excess of $60,000,12 2 
and that there are a number of deductions to be considered in the calculation 
of the taxable estate. Most tmpot tant of these is the n1arital deduction, which 
permits a deduction for up to one-half the value of the gross estate for prop-
erty transferred to a survtving spouse.12a Joint tenancy property expressly 
qualifies for the marital deduction. 121 Therefore, joint tenancy between hus-
band and wife should cause no e tate tax problems in estates of less than 
$120,000. 
/o }va Inheritance Tax 
The Iowa Inheritance Tax, as outlined in Chapter 450 of the Iowa Code, 
is a tax on the succession to both real and personal property by reason of 
the death of the owner. Taxable transfers specifically include the passage of 
property that is "jointly held by the decedent and any other person or per-
sons." 125 Except to the extent that the survivor can prove that he provided 
consideration at the time the joint tenancy was created, he will be taxed on 
the entire value of the property passing to him as a joint tenant. 126 
The scope of the inheritance taxation of jointly held property was dtscussed 
by the court in Estate of Louden 121 where the status of government bonds 
was in is ue. Construing the term " jointly held" the cout t pointed out that 
the purview of the tax law was broader than the technical concept of joint 
tenancy. "The intent of the legislature to reach property held by two or more 
parties so that upon the death of one it passes directly to the survivor, or 
survivors, is manifest." 
The court made it clear that the wording in 450.3 ( 5) concerning the por-
tion of the property "proven to have belonged to the survivor" refers to sub-
stantial ownership and not ownership in form alone. The essential question 
is what did the survivor contribute to the purchase of the property, and not 
what was his proportionate undivided interest. 
The inheritance tax applies to all estates over $1 ,000 in value, 128 but 
because of the personal cxcn1ptions accorded members of the in1n1ediate 
121 See no tes 179-182 infrn and accompanytng text. 
122 Int. Rev. C'ode of 1954, § 2052. 
t2 :J Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(a). There arc qualification~ and limits, of course. 
Sec§§ 2056 (b)(c). 
121 Treas. Reg. 20.2056(e)-l(l). 
1:.w Iowa Code§ 450.3(5) (1962). 
1 !?O Sec In rc Estate of I oudcn, 249 Iowa 1391, 92 N W 2d 409 ( 1958). 
127 249 Iowa 1393, 92 N.W 2d 409 ( 19S8). 
12H Iowa Code§ 450 4( 1) ( 1962). 
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family and the relatively low tax rates, the tax is of real importance primarily 
in larger estates. 1 2 9 The recent changes in the rate structure have increased 
the significance of the tax,l 30 however, and in certain medium-sized estates 
inheritance tax may be a greater concern than the federal estate tax. 
The chart at the end of this section illustrates the death tax results under 
various circumstances. 
Federal Gift Tax 
In joint tenancies involving personal property and in those involving rea] 
property to which the special provisions regarding husband and wife do not 
apply, a taxable gift occurs on the creation of the relationship to the extent 
the consideration furnished by one joint tenant exceeds the interest acquired 
by him in the property under local law.131 Likewise, on the termination of 
such a joint tenancy a taxable gift may be found whenever the separate share 
in the property or proceeds received by one joint tenant is less than his 
proportionate interest in the property under local law .132 
The one exception recognized to the above pattern is in the case of certain 
jointly owned intangibles where the donor joint owner can reappropriate the 
entire property to his own use. In such cases, no taxable gift is recognized 
until the donee actually receives a portion of the asset.133 For example, in a 
joint bank account created by A for himself and B, no gift is made to B until 
B draws on the account for his own benefit, and then the gift is limited to 
the amount withdrawn. 
Special Rules Regarding R eal Property Betlveen Husband and Wife. Under 
section 2515 of the Internal Revenue Code there is no taxable gift upon the 
creation of a joint tenancy in real property between husband and wife unless 
the parties so elect. This applies only to: ( 1) joint tenancies between husband 
and wife, (2 ) joint tenancies in real property, and (3) joint tenancies created 
after 19 54. All three of these conditions must be satisfied before section 
2515 is operative. 
This sectton permits the deferment of the taxation until the tenancy is 
terminated. If the tenancy is terminated by death of a spouse, the estate tax 
is applicable, but if the termination is in any other manner a taxable gift may 
be found if the proceeds received by one spouse are larger than the proceeds 
allocable to the consideration furnished by that spouse to the tenancy. 1 34 
Thus, where the husband paid the entire consideration for the property and 
no election was made, if, on sale of the joint tenancy he retains the entire 
1 29 Iowa Code §§ 450.9, .10. 
130 H .F. 679, 61st G.A. (1965). 
131 Treas. Reg.§ 25.2511-l(h)(5). 
132 Treas. Reg § 25 2512-8. 
1:Ja Treas. Reg§ 25.2511-l(h) (4 ). 
134 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2515(b) Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-3. 
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proceeds, no gift is recognized. No termination of the tenancy occurs where 
the property subject to the tenancy is exchanged for other real property, the 
title to which is held by the spouses in an identical tenancy. 135 
Where an election is made to treat the creation of the joint tenancy as a 
gift, the later termination of the relationship has no gift tax consequences 
unless one tenant receives tnore than his proportionate share in the prop-
erty.tao 
Deductions, Exclusions, and G1jt Splitting. The impact of gift taxation on a 
joint tenancy cannot be accurately assessed without recognizing the various 
provisions of the gift tax law that may be utilized to reduce taxes. The first 
$3,000 of gifts made to each individual each year are tax free. 1 3 7 Every person 
has a $30,000 lifetime exemption that may be applied to taxable gifts at any 
time. 138 
A gift-tax marital deduction permits one half of the value of gifts between 
spouses to be deducted in computing the tax. 130 This deduction is subject to 
the same general qualifications as the estate tax marital deduction including 
the "terminable interest" Iimitation.14 0 A transfer to the spouse severing a 
marital joint tenancy should cause no terminable interest problem, and a 
transfer to a spouse as a joint tenant either with the donor or with some third 
party would seem to fall within exceptions to the terminable interest limita-
tion.141 
Under Section 2513 of the Internal Revenue Code a husband and wife are 
permitted to split gifts made by either of them filing a consent to such an 
arrangement. This most beneficial privilege would seem to offer little ad-
vantage in gifts by husband and wife joint tenants, except in cases where one 
spouse may have a large portion of the lifetime exemption left or be in a 
lower gift tax bracket. 
The chart at the end of this section illustrates the gift tax results under 
various circumstances. Iowa, of course, has no state gift tax. 
Federal Income Tax 
Survivor's Basis in the Property. Section 1014 (b) (9) of the Internal 
Revenue Code provides that for a decedent dying after December 31, 1953, 
the surviving joint tenant's tax basis is the fair market value of the property 
to the extent the property is included in determining the decedent joint tenant's 
135 Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-l(d)(2)(ii). 
1 30 Treas. Regs.§§ 25.2515-1 (d), 25.2515-4 
1:n Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2503 (b), Treas. Reg § 25.2503-2. 
138 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2521, Treas. Reg. § 25.2521-1. 
130 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2523(a), (d) , Treas. Regs.§§ 25 2523(a)-1, 25.2523(d)-1. 
140 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2523(b), Treas. Reg.§ 25.2523(b)-1. 
141 Int Rev. Code of 1954, § 2523(d), Treas. Regs. §§ 25 2523(d)-1, 25.2523(e)-1 
(g)(2). 
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estate for estate tax purposes. 142 This n1ay be a substantial benefit to the surviv-
ing joint tenant whenever the property has substantially appreciated in value. 
Where only a part of the property is included in the deceased tenant's gross 
estate, the survivor's basis is the sum of his old basis in his interest plus the 
estate tax value of the included portion.143 
To some extent this section relieves the hardship to a surviving joint owner 
who is unable to sustain the burden of proving that he contributed to the pur-
chase of the property. In some cases, the survivor may not try very hard to 
make this proof because the estate tax may be more than offset by the income 
tax savings which may be realized as a result of a substantial acceleration of 
the tax basis in the property. 
Allocation of Income and Expenses. The general rule is that income from 
jointly owned property is taxed equally to all the joint tenants.144 Also, in-
come from the sale of property is generally allocable equally to all the joint 
tenants. 145 Dividends are considered as being received by each tenant to the 
extent he is entitled under local la\XJ to a share of such dividends.146 
The rules regarding deductibility of expenses are generally consistent with 
the income splitting concept discussed above. Even where he has paid the 
full amount of an expense, a joint tenant is limited to his proportionate share 
of the deduction on the ground that he is entitled to reimbursement from the 
other tenant.117 
The Iowa Income tax law relating to joint tenancy is substantially identical 
to the federal income tax. 148 
142 A limited exception to this statement exists where the survivor has realized the bene-
fit of any depreciation deducttons attributable to the property Included in the gross 
estate. Thus where a husband pays for a perishable asset and tah.es the title in JOint 
tenancy. under local law the jo1nt tenant wife is considered to have realized one half 
of any depreciation deductton taken. When the property is wholly included in the 
husband's gross estate the new basis is the market value less the depreciation deduc-
tion constructively enjoyed by the survivor. Treas Reg. § 1.1014-6 (a) (2). This 
result has been criticized as causing a double write off. See Anderson, "Pros and 
Cons of Holding Real Estate," 14 J . Tax 355 ( 1961). 
14'~ Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(a), Treas. Reg.§ 1.1014-1. 
144 2 P-H Federal Taxes U 7512 (1965). 
l45Jbid. 
146Treas. Reg.§ 1.34-l(d). 
147 Estate of Boyd, 28 T.C 564 (1957) , Reynolds v. Commissioner 26 TC. 1225 (1956). 
However, where a husband paid the enttre mortgage interest, Jt has been held that 
he may tak.c the entire amount on his separate return. See F. C. Nicodemus, Jr., 26 
B.T.A. 125 (1932). 
148 See Iowa Code c. 422 ( 1962) See generally Mtller, The New Iowa Income Tax Law, 
41 Iowa L. Rev. 85 (1955); Weible, "Accountability of Cotenants," 29 Iowa L. Rev. 
558 ( 1944). 
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IOWA STAlE TRAVELING LIBRARY 
DES MOINES, IOWA 
FEDERAL AND IOWA TAXATION OF 
NATURE OF ORIGINAL TRANSFER 
1. H transfers realty owned by him into 
joint tenancy with W, or purchases 
realty and takes title in joint tenancy 
With W, on or after January 1, 1955. 
2. Same transfers before January 1, 1955. 
3. Same transfers between parties other 
than H and W, e.g., father transfers 
realty owned by him into joint tenancy 
with son or purchases realty and takes 
title in names of both as joint tenants. 
4. Donor purchases stock in joint tenancy 
with another. 
5. Donor purchases government bonds reg-
istered in names of donor and donee as 
co-owners, donor retaining full control. 
6. Donor deposits money in joint bank ac-
count, intending "true joint tenancy." 
7. Donor deposits money in joint checking 
account, intending to reserve full power 
to withdraw. 
8. Donor deposits money in joint savings 
account, intending to retain full control 
during life by retention of the passbook. 
9. X, as a gift, transfers any type of prop-
erty into joint names of Y and Z (who 
may or may not be H&W) ; realty, stock, 
bonds, bank account, etc. 
* Iowa has no gift tax 
GIFT TAX ON CREATION* 
1. Federal-(a) None unless H elects to 
treat as a g1ft. IRC 2515 (a). (b) H 
may elect to treat as a gift of half 
interest IRC 2515 (c) subject to mar-
ital deduction IRC 2523 . 
2. Federal-gift of half interest taxed sub-
ject to marital deduction under IRC 
2523. 
3. Federal-gift of half interest is taxed. 
Regs. 25.2511-1 (h)(5). 
4. Federal-gift of half interest is taxed. 
Regs 25.2511-1 (h) (5). If Hand W, 
marital deduction is allowable as in 1 
above. 
5. F ederal-gift only to extent that donee 
surrenders obhgations for cash with-
out an obligation to account for a 
part of the proceeds to donor. Regs. 
25.2511-1 (h) (4). 
6. Federal-gift to the extent that donee 
draws on the account without obliga-
tion to donor. Regs. 25 251 1-1 (h ) 
( 4) . See also 25.2511-1 (g) ( 1 ) . 
7. Federal-same as 6 above. 
8. Federal-same as 6 and 7 above. 
9. Federal- taxed as gift of half interest to 
Y and half to Z. IRC 2501. 
t This chart is adapted from one appearing in Effland, Estate Planning: Co-ownership 
39, Seminar Series for Wisconsin Attornies, University of Wisconsin ( 1957). 
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VARIOUS FORMS OF JOINT OWNERSHIPt 
GIFT TAX ON TERMINATION* 
DURING LIFETIME 
1. Federal-(a) gift to extent that W re-
ceives proceeds IRC 2515 (b), subject 
to marital deduction. (b) gift to ex-
tent that etther receives more than 
half of the proceeds, subject to mar-
ital deduction. IRC 2515 (b) . 
2. Federal-same as 1 (b) above. 
TAXES ON TERMINATION AT DEATH 
OF DONOR 
(ESTA TE & INHERITANCE) 
1. Federal- Both (a) and (b) taxed 100% 
1n estate of H. IRC 2040; qualifies for 
marital deduction under IRC 2056(e) 
(5). 
Iowa-1 00% taxed under 450.3 (5). 
2. Federal-same as 1 above. 
Iowa-same as 1 above. 
3. Federal-same as 1 (b) above but no 3. Federal-same as 1 above but without 
marital deduction. the marital deduction. 
4. Federal-gift if either receives more 
than half of proceeds (if H&W, mar-
ital deduction allowed). 
5. Federal-gift to extent that donee re-
ceives any of the proceeds. 
6. Federal-same as 5 above. 
7. Federal-gift to extent that donee is 
permitted to withdraw and retain any 
of funds. 
8 Federal-gift to the extent donee draws 
and retains any funds. 
Iowa-No tax. 
9. Federal-gift to the extent that either 
receives over half of proceeds. 
Iowa-same as I above. 
4. Federal-same as 1 above. 
Iowa-same as 1 above. 
5. Federal-taxed 100% IRC 2040. 
Iowa- taxed 100% 450.3 (5) Iowa code. 
6. Federal-taxed 100% . 
Iowa- taxed 100% . 
7. Federal-100% taxable . 
Iowa- probably 100% taxable. See 249 
Iowa 1393 (1958). 
8 Federal-tOO% taxable. 
Iowa-probably 100% taxable. 
9. Federal-not taxable to donor unless 
transfer in contemplation of death 
within 3 years- 50% taxable on 
death of a joint tenant. 
Iowa-same 450.3 (2) as amended 
7/ 4/ 65. 
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PLANNING A SEVERANCE 
If the decision is made to terminate certain of the client's joint tenancies, 
the selection of the method for effecting the severance may require a thorough 
evaluation of the several available alternatives. Space limitations preclude 
inquiry into all of the possible means of ridding the estate of a joint tenancy. 
However, the options most likely to be realistic in the great majority of cases 
are sale of the whole property, transferring to one of the joint tenants com-
plete ownership, converting into a tenancy in common, and transferring the 
property in whole or in part to someone else in the family. These common 
procedures for doing away with a joint tenancy may have markedly different 
family and tax implications. 
One problem that may arise in the course of planning a severance is the 
discovery that an earlier gift made in creating the joint tenancy was not re-
ported for gift tax purposes. Quite often before a joint tenancy is severed, it 
is necessary to straighten out such prior gifts and report them, lest the sever-
ance have unnecessary tax ramifications. If in excess of the annual exclusion, 
such gifts should be reported, even though the use of the allowable deductions 
or the $30,000 exemption would permit the donor to escape paying any tax. 
The allowable deductions and the lifetime exemption must be properly claimed 
to be used.149 Except for a husband and wife situation under Section 2515, 
the Revenue Service will usually accept the filing of a late return. An election 
to treat a transfer as a gift under Section 2515 must be timely filed. 1 50 
TRANSFER FOR VALUE 
If the property held in joint tenancy is readily salable, the simplest way to 
terminate the joint tenancy would be to convert the property into cash. A 
sale for full value outside the family should avoid any disputes over owner-
ship of the property among the family or with the tax collectors. Like most 
simple answers, this solution has so many qualifications that it has limited 
utility. In the first place, it is of no help where the joint property is itself 
cash, or, more accurately, a right to obtain cash, e.g., a bank account. 
Also, there may be any number of personal reasons why the joint tenants 
might not wish to sell certain property, e.g., the family farm. Of course, a 
sale within the family may solve these objections, but this opens up additional 
problems.151 If the property is not of a type for which there is a ready market, 
149 E & G vol. P-H Fed. Tax Serv. U1f 125, 210; 125, 290. 
150 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2515(c). 
151 For example, if the sale is to be made to a child, financing the purchase may require 
the extension of a long-term credit by the parent. Such credit arrangements may 
involve aspects of a gift if the terms are too favorable to the purchaser-child. Also 
the arrangement may be a burden to other beneficiaries of the estate, if it may con-
tinue for an extended period after the seller's death. See generally Harris and Hines, 
Installment Land Contracts in Iowa, Agricultural Law Center Monograph No. 5 
( 1965). 
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a sale of the property may be economically unwise. 
From a tax standpoint, if the property has appreciated considerably, the 
joint tenants may not wish to realize a large taxable gain at the time. The 
relative life expectancies of the parties may be such that it would be advisable 
to transfer the total ownershlp to one on the likelihood that at his death the 
tax basis of the property would be accelerated. 1 02 
Handling of the cash sale proceeds may cause gift tax headaches where 
one joint tenant has furnished most or all of the consideration. If a joint 
tenancy involving real estate owned by a husband and wife was created after 
1954 and no gift tax election was filed, the husband should have no gift tax 
liability if he keeps the entire sale proceeds. 153 However, if under such cir-
cumstances he divides the sale proceeds with his wife, he is likely making a 
taxable gift.154 If the joint tenancy is between others than husband and wife, 
or is a pre-1954 husband and wife arrangement, or is a post 1954 joint 
tenancy for which an election was filed, there will be a taxable gift only if 
the joint tenants do not each receive their proportionate share of the pro-
ceeds.155 The one exception to this statement is where the creation of the 
joint tenancy did not result in an immediate taxable gift, for example, where 
the joint tenancy was in a bank account or in certain government bonds.156 
TRANSFER TO ONE JOINT TENANT 
Consolidation of the undivided interests in one of the joint owners through 
a transfer from the others is a technique offering considerable promise in 
some estates. If the other joint tenants will agree to such a transfer and this 
may be no small problem on occasion, it may be possible to make some tax-
free division of the estate while effecting a severance of the joint tenancy. 
For example, where a husband and wife own in joint tenancy two parcels of 
investment real estate of approximately identical worth, each could convey 
his one-half interest in different tracts to the other. If each was recognized as 
the owner of his undivided interest, the transfer may be entirely free from all 
taxes. Of course, it is unusual to get a situation where different items of prop-
erty have identical values, but this idea of unifying the interests in particular 
assets by cross-transferring jointly owned property deserves further pursuit. 
If a true cross-transfer is effected, there should be no concern over the 
property being included in the estate of the transferor, even if the exchange 
was made in contemplation of death, because the transfer was for adequate 
consideration.157 
152 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014 (basis for property acquired from a decedent is the 
market value at the date of decedent's death). 
153 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2515(b), Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-3(a). 
154 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2515(b), Treas Reg. §25.2515-3(a). 
155Treas. Regs.§§ 25.2511-1(h)(5), 25.2515-3(a), 25.2515-4. 
156Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l(h)(4). 
157 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035. 
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Interests in property held for productive use in trade or business or for 
investment may be exchanged income tax free.l 58 In such exchanges each 
joint tenant takes for a basis in the interest acquired the amount that was his 
basi~ in the interest transferred. 1 5 9 
Where the properties to be exchanged are not eligible for a tax free ex-
change under Section 1031 and have appreciated substantially in value, the 
potential income tax liability may be so large as to require resort to some less 
costly method of severance. If a non-tax free cross-transfer is carried out, the 
basis situation might be somewhat complicated because each transferee would 
have different bases in each half of the property now consolidated-the old 
basis in the half retained and a basis in the half transferred to him equal to 
the value of his interest in the property transferred.1 60 
Any time the proportionate joint ownership has been established for gift 
tax purposes, there should be no gift tax liability incurred by cross-transfer, 
except to the extent the interest received by one party exceeds the value of 
the interest transferred.161 The cross-transfer plan could obviously cause gift 
tax problems whenever the original transfer in joint tenancy did not constitute 
a complete gift. Thus, for example, where the one joint ownership involves 
realty between husband and wife and was created subsequent to 1954, and 
no gift tax election was timely filed, there may be no consideration for the 
transfers to one joint tenant. 162 
Laying aside cross-transfers, if the only desire is to restore complete owner-
ship in the co-tenant who has paid the total consideration for the property, 
the transfer is most easily accomplished, tax-wise, where the creation 
of the joint tenancy did not amount to a completed gift the father who has 
deposited all of the money in a joint account with his children may draw 
out the funds without receiving a gift from them. 1 63 The corollary of this 
proposition also bears watching. If the donee in the incomplete joint tenancy 
is later transferred the entire property, there is a gift to the total extent of the 
property tarnsferred-if, in the father-children joint account above, the 
children withdraw all of the funds, they have received a gift in the amount 
withdrawn.164 
Where the undivided interests are recognized as being fully owned by the 
respective joint tenants, and the intent is simply to destroy the co-ownership 
1 58 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1031 , Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1. 
159 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 103l(d), Treas. Reg.§ 1.103l(d)-l(n). 
lGO Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1001, Treas. Reg. 1.1001-1. 
101 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512, Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8. 
162 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2515(b) , Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8. 
103 Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1(b) (4). 
16-t Treas. Reg. 25.2511-l(b)(4). 
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by transferring all the undivided interests to one of the co-tenants, the gift 
and income tax results are relatively clear. Regardless of the relationship 
of the parties, 165 there is a gift to the transferee to the extent he receives the 
outstanding interests for less than full value.166 The gift causes no realization 
of income, 167 nor does it give rise to any deduction in the usual case.168 The 
donee takes the donor's basis in the interest received. 160 
If the transfer is for less than adequate consideration and within three 
) cars prior to the death of the transferor, the possibility exists that the prop-
erty would be included in the transferor's estate as a gift in contemplation of 
death. 170 If it is so included, the estate may receive a credit against the federal 
estate tax for any gift tax paid on the transfer .1 71 Iowa has no gift tax, so the 
Iowa tax problems in planning the severance are limited to minimizing income 
and inheritance taxes. 
CONVERTING INTO A T ENANCY IN COMMON 
If it is determined that a joint-tenancy ownership does not fit the family 
needs or may cause undue tax liability or administration difficulties, a destruc-
tion of the survivorship rights may be all that is required, the co-ownership 
being retained as a tenancy in con1mon. If this is the choice, a simple memo-
randum signed by all the joint tenants in which they relinquish their rights 
to take by survivorship should be adequate to sever the joint tenancy.172 More 
often, this result is accomplished by a deed by all of the joint tenants con-
veying to themselves as tenants in common. In some jurisdictions the validity 
of such a conveyance has been questioned, but in Iowa it is well settled that 
such a transfer is effective to sever the joint tenancy.173 Conservative estate 
planners may still insist on having the joint tenants transfer to a strawman 
· who reconveys to them as tenants in common. 
The character of the jointly owned property is a factor to be considered in 
deciding what sort of an adjustment is most advantageous. It may be unwise 
16::> The relatiOnship of the parties may influence the amount of gift tax liability-if they 
are husband and wife the gift tax marital deduction will be available. Int. Rev. Code 
of 1954, § 2523(d), Treas. Reg. 25.2523(d)(1). 
166 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512(b), Treas. Reg. 25.25 12-8. 
1G7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102, Treas. Reg. § 1.102-1. 
1 as Only gifts of a charitable nature as described in the Code are deductible. Int. Rev. 
Code of 1954, § 170, Treas. Reg.§ 1.1701. 
1GO Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1015(a), Treas. Reg.§ 1.1015-1. 
170 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2035, Iowa Code, § 450.3. Note that the time period in 
the Iowa provision has recently been changed from two to three years to conform 
to the federal law. The new Iowa provision is effective for decedents dying on or after 
July 4, 1965. H ouse File 679, 61st G.A. ( 1965). 
171 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2012, Treas. Reg. § 20.2012-1. 
172 See Notes 68, 69 supra and accompanying text 
l73See Fay v. Smtley, 201 Iowa 1290,207 N.W. 369 (1926). 
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to remove the survivorship rights without consolidating ownership in one of 
the co-owners. For example, the potential for parceling of a farm or business 
property inherent in joint ownership by tenants in common may be quite 
inconsistent with the long-range aims of the estate plan. 
Conversion of the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common is an adjust-
Inent that does not require the consent of the other joint tenants. In absence 
of a binding contract protecting the survivorship rights, any joint tenant has 
the power to unilaterally sever this incident of the co-ownership. He may 
effect the severance in several ways, but the n1ost practical method if he wants 
to retain an interest is a conveyance of his interest to a strawman who im-
mediately reconveys. Thus, if there is some resistance by other joint tenants 
to the realignment of the joint interests, the survivorship aspect of the co-
ownership can be dissolved with little difficulty, and if necessary without the 
other joint tenants even knowing that such a severance has taken place. Of 
course, if more than two persons are involved in the joint tenancy, the sever-
ance of the relationship by one does not affect the survivorship rights of the 
other parties among themselves.174 
Arguably, the conversion of a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common 
should cause no tax liabilities because the ownership interests have not 
changed each still owns the same quantum of undivided interest. In the 
easy case where the joint tenants each fully own their undivided interests 
and the severance is effected more than three years before the death of any 
co-tenant, this should be the result. Because Iowa apparently does not recog-
nize the tenancy by the entireties as such, 175 a disparity between the joint 
tenants relative life expectancies should not cause tax concern.176 However, 
at least a couple of tax problems may arise in converting to a tenancy in 
common. 
Where the joint tenancy to be severed was within the election requirements 
of Section 2515 on creation and no gift was reported, conversion of the 
ownership into a tenancy in common will result in a taxable gift to the extent 
one spouse contributed more than one-half of the consideration in the acquisi-
tion of the property.177 It is a little difficult to imagine a case where an ad-
174 See Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 174 N.W. 946 (1922). 
175 See discussion on pages 4 & 5 infra. 
176 Where a non-severable joint ownership is involved, such as a tenancy by the entirety, 
on termination Section 2515 (b) requires an inquiry into the relative life expectancies 
of the co-tenants to determine the gift tax results. For example, a husband and wife 
are given property by a third person as tenants by the entirety. At a time when the 
husband is 30 and the wife 25, they sell the property for $15,000. At that time 
under the actuarial tables H's interest in the property was 46* per cent and W's 
531A per cent. If they distribute the proceeds in any other proportion, a gift will 
be found of the difference. For a more complete discussion of this problem see 
Joint Tenancy and the Federal Tax Law, 101 Trusts & Est. 1151 (1962). 
177 Treas. Reg. §25.2515-3. 
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vantage would be gained through switching to a tenancy in common of bank 
accounts or government bonds, but if such a transfer was effected, presum-
ably the same gift tax potential would exist as in the Section 2515 situation.178 
To illustrate, suppose that in 1955 a husband and wife purchased a farm 
for $100,000, H providing $60,000 of the purchase price and W supplying 
the other $40,000 from her personal funds. The title is taken in joint tenancy, 
but no gift tax return is filed. In 1965, when the farm is worth $150,000 H 
and W convey to each other an undivided one-half interest as tenants in com-
mon. H has made a gift of $15,000 toW at this time. Her contribution would 
entitle her to a 40 per cent interest ( $60,000) in the farm, instead she received 
a 50 per cent ($75,000) interest; therefore, she received a gift in the amount 
of the difference. 
Precarious is perhaps the appropriate description for the status of transfers 
converting a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common within three years of the 
death of a joint owner. The Internal Revenue Service seems currently com-
mitted to challenging on every occasion the once well-accepted principle that 
no taxable transfer takes place because under local property law the parties 
have the same relative interest in the property after the severance as before.179 
The precise issue in these cases is whether the "interest transfer" language in 
Section 2035 refers to the interest actually owned and controlled by the trans-
feror, or, as the service contends, to the interest that would have been included 
in the transferor's taxable estate had the transfer not been made. 
The taxpayer's position finds support in Estate of Sullivan, 180 which is 
still regarded as the leading decision on the question. The rationale of the 
Sullivan rule was that the interest "transferred" by a joint owner in con-
templation of death could not exceed the interest which he held or controlled 
under local lav;. Thus, no interest was "transferred" where a joint tenancy 
was severed in a manner that fully recognized the co-owners' proportionate 
interests. Alternatively, the court pointed out that it could be found that the 
mutual relinquishment of survivorship rights was adequate consideration for 
the transfer. 
To date, the government has not won a decisive victory on this battle-
ground, but some inroads have been made. For example, in Estate of Allen,181 
the Tenth Circuit accepted the government's theory in a case involving the 
relinquishment of a retained life interest in contemplation of death and in-
cluded in the estate the entire value of property in which the interest was 
released instead of the value of the life interest itself. Although the problem 
178Treas. Regs.§§ 25.2511-1(3), (e), (h)(4). 
1 79 See Young, Severance of Joint Tenancy in Contenzplation of Death-Will There Be 
a New L ook? 15 J. Taxation 156 (1961). 
180 175 F .2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949). 
l81293 F.2d 916 (lOth Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944. 
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is somewhat different than severance of a joint tenancy, the underlying con-
cept is the same. The contrary result was reached subsequently by the Seventh 
Circuit in Estate of Glaser, 182 which definitely revitalized the Sullivan rule. 
At the moment, then, the situation seems to be this: Until the Supreme 
Court resolves the issue, the government is likely to continue to challenge 
joint tenancy severances within three years of death; therefore, almost any 
such severance may lead to a hassle with the government. On the other hand, 
the simple conversion from joint tenancy into a tenancy in common \vill prob-
ably be the hardest case for government to upset, and proof of a live motive 
for the transfer is always an avenue open to the taxpayer. So where the sever-
ance is important to the estate, the planner should proceed on the assumption 
that Sullivan is the "law," but at the same time build whatever foundation he 
can to substantiate a claim of a live motive, if such should become necessary. 
Where the joint tenancy is between husband and wife, the contemplation 
of death problem may be of lesser importance owing to the availability of the 
marital deduction. But this need not always be the case. For example, what 
are the estate tax results in the following situation? H owns stock in joint ten-
ancy with W for which H paid the entire purchase price. In year one H severs 
the joint tenancy with W in contemplation of death. Later that same year, W 
dies and one-half the property is included in her estate. In year three, but 
over two years after W's death, H dies. If the entire value of the property 
is included in H's estate under 2035, does H have any deductions or credits 
against the estate tax?183 
TRANSFER TO A FAMILY MEMBER 
One well-established estate-planning technique is the partial disposition of 
the estate through lifetime gifts within the family. Joint tenancy interests may 
be the subject of such gifts, and in some situations inter vivos transfers of 
jointly owned property may fulfill several estate planning objectives at once. 
For example, a gift of jointly owned property to a child may reduce the 
donor's taxable estate, lessen over-all family income taxes by spreading 
income to lower bracket taxpayers, avoid complications arising from the joint 
ownership, permit the child to receive his eventual inheritance immediately 
and therefore to plan his life with more certainty and security, and promote 
over-all family harmony. 
On the negative side, if not carefully planned, such a lifetime gift may 
deplete unduly the donor's income or financial reserves, burden a child with 
182 306 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962), reversing 196 F. Supp. 47 (D.C. Ind. 1961). 
183 The marital deduction appears to be allowed only in a case where there is a living 
spouse. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(a) . Among the possibilities to consider are 
the credits for the gift tax paid, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2012, and for the tax on 
prior transfers, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2013. See also the Regulations correspond-
ing to these sections. 
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the responsibilities of O\vnership prematurely, create dissension within the 
family by generating feelings of favontism for or discrimination against par-
ticular individuals, and result in unnecessary liability for gift taxes. Regardless 
of the care exercised in planning, the transfer may be found to be in contem-
plation of death if the donor dies within three years. 
Through thoughtful planning, the balance can often be struck in favor of 
transferring the jointly oVvned property to a family member. The transfer for 
value and the consolidation of the property ownership in one joint tenant have 
been discussed earlier. The transfer alternatives remaining are a gift of one 
co-owner's undivided interest to someone else \vithin the family, a gift of the 
jointly owned property by all of the co-owners, and a gtft of etther type with 
the retention of certain life interests. 
Gift of an Undivided Interest 
A transfer giving a\vay one tenant's interest in jointly owned property is a 
simple way to dispose of the joint tenancy, but it may have certain disad-
vantages. For one thing, such a gift contains the potential for needlessly com-
plicating the O\'vnership situation, depending on the relationship between the 
donee and the other co-owners. An example of bad planning would be a gift 
of an undivided interest to the donor's mother, where the other co-tenant is 
the donor's wife. Aside from "mother-in-law" problen1s, there is a real pos-
sibility that on the parent's death the undivided interest would be further 
fractionalized and ultimately a sale or partition of the property would be 
necessitated. On the other hand, a transfer of an individual interest may best 
fit the intentions of the donor. For example, obtaining the maximum benefit 
of the gift tax split-gift provisions in combination with the annual exclusion 
may require husband and wife co-owners to transfer their interests in different 
years.1 84 The point is that the nature of the property and the vicissitudes of 
the family situation should be carefully considered before counseling a gift 
of an undivided interest. 
From a tax standpoint the problems are not dissimilar to those already 
discussed in connection with other transfers. The gift of undivided interest is 
taxable like any other gift, the amount of the gift being the value of the 
interest when transferred. 1 85 
One snare of which to be wary is a gift of an interest in Section 2515 
property acquired since 1954 with separate funds for which no election was 
filed. A transfer of an undivided interest causes a severance and would, there-
fore, constitute a gift to the other spouse of any difference between the value 
of the proportionate ownership to which the spouse is entitled, as a tenant in 
1 84 Int Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2503, Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-2 (annual exclusion), 2513, 
Treas. Reg. § 25 2513-1 (splitting gifts). 
l 85 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512(a), Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1. 
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common, and the value of the share to which the spouse would have been 
entitled, based on her proportionate contributions.1 86 
If no interests are retained, the property transferred should not be includ-
ible in the donor's taxable estate unless the gift was made in contemplation 
of death. If includtble for that reason, then the issue arises as to how much 
should be included. Where, except for the gifts, the whole value of the joint 
tenancy property would have been includible in the donor's gross estate, the 
government will likely urge inclusion of the total value. As discussed earlier, 
whether it will be successful in this contention is somewhat in doubt.187 The 
donee takes the donor's tax basis in the undivided interest, including any 
reduction required by depreciation deductions taken by the donor.188 
Gift of the Whole Property 
Obviously, giving away jointly owned property requires the assent of all 
joint tenants. Where such assent can be obtained and sound reasons exist for 
making the gift, a transfer of the whole property avoids some of the pitfalls 
discussed in the preceding section. As a practical matter it is as easy to execute 
a conveyance by all joint tenants as it is by one, if they are in accord. 
Tax-wise, the gift will be treated as made proportionately by each joint 
tenant. 18 9 Here again , the g1ft tax results are relatively straight-forward 
except where the joint tenancy relationship involves an uncompleted gift. 
For example, suppose the property transferred was realty acquired by a hus-
band and wife since 1954 and no election \vas filed. If the husband had paid 
for the property from separate funds, what is the effect of the wife joining 
in the conveyance as a grantor? Is she to be regarded as receiving a gift to 
the extent of the one-half interest recognized by her in the conveyance? If 
she does not sign the conveyance as a grantor, a valid transfer of the whole 
property will not be effected. It would appear that this case is distinguishable 
from both the division of sale proceeds and the gift by one tenant which 
causes a severance, and that no gift should be recognized. 
The gift in contemplation of death raises the same issues here as discussed 
earlier. It might be noted that a gift of the \Vhole property by husband and 
wife as joint tenants is the fact Situation in which the contemplation of death 
question is most commonly litigated. 1 no If the gift is important to the estate 
plan it should nevertheless be made. If the donor survives three years no 
question can be raised. If not, the only substantial risk is the probability of 
having to litigate the issue if it arises and, of course, this can be avoided by 
180 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2515(b), Treas. Regs.§§ 25.2515-3, -4. 
l 87 See cases cited notes 179-182 supra, and accompanying text. 
188 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1015(a), Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-1. 
18!>Jnt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512, Treas. Reg.§§ 25.251 1-l (h)(6), 2525 12-5. 
190 See 3 Mertens, Law of Federal Gift and Estate Taxation, § 22.04 (1959). 
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conceding the question. If a gift tax is paid and then the property is brought 
back into the donor's gross estate, a credit will be available.191 
Retention of Life Interests 
The severance of a joint tenancy by a transfer in which life interests in the 
property are retained is an arrangement that offers both interesting possibil-
ities and difficult problems. Such a transfer may be accomplished by a direct 
gift to the donee with a retained life estate or through the use of a trust. The 
traditional objections to the use of legal life estate would suggest that the 
trust arrangement might hold more promise. The retained life estates may be 
of the "joint and survivor., variety .1 H2 
Generally, the same considerations are involved in the decision to retain 
a life interest on the transfer of jointly owned property as on the transfer of 
separate property. Income from a life interest will be taxable to the donor,193 
and the value of the life interest will be figured in calculating the value of the 
gift. 194 Because the gift involves a future interest, the $3,000 annual exclusion 
will not be available. 1 n:; 
The retained life interest adds a ne\v dimension to the estate tax problems 
associated with joint tenancy. The central issue, however, is the san1e as that 
raised earlier in the contemplation-of-death discussion. If Section 2036 re-
quires the inclusion in the gross estate of property in which the decedent 
has retained a life interest, and except for the transfer with the retained life 
interest the whole jointly owned property would have been included, can the 
government tax all or only half of the property? The latest answer to this 
question was supplied by the Seventh Circuit in Estate of Glaser196 in a 
· rather unequivocal holding that only the portion over which he bad control 
under local law was taxable. The commissioner has not acquiesced in the 
Glaser decision and it is not expected that Glaser will be the last word on 
the issue. 
To reduce the vulnerability of this type of severance to the minin1um, the 
best practice would seem to be first to convert the joint tenancy into a ten-
ancy in common. Then each joint tenant may convey his undivided interest 
to the intended donee, reserving a life estate in himself and creating a sur-
vivorship life interest in the other joint tenant. Such a procedure should nullify 
the commissioner's argument that in a severance which involves the retention 
191 Int. Rev Code of 1954, § 2012(a), Treas. Reg.§ 20 2012-1. 
192See, e.g., Estate of Borner, 25 T.C. 584 (1955). 
l93Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §102(b)(l), Treas. Reg.§ 1.102-1. 
194 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2512(a), Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(c). 
195 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2503(b), Treas. Regs.§§ 25.2503-2, -3. 
19G 306 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962), reversing 196 F. Supp. 47 (D. C. Ind. 1961). 
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of survivorship life estates the donor has retained a contingent life interest 
in the other tenant's share of the property.197 
INTEGRATING JOINT TENANCY INTO THE 
ESTATE PLAN 
Seldom does the holding of property ownership in joint tenancy constitute 
a complete estate plan. Steps may be required to preserve the evidence of 
the joint tenancy arrangement and to guard against its unintentional severance. 
In most estates there will be some individually owned property to contend with. 
Because joint tenancy only transfers the property to the survivor, problems 
in making a disposition during his life or at his death must be anticipated. 
The possibility of a family catastrophe should be recognized and provided 
for. Often trusts and guardianships are indicated by the presence of minor 
children or incompetents in the family. Where a substantial portion of the 
estate is held in joint tenancy, care must be taken to assure that sufficient 
liquid assets are available in the estate to satisfy the various obligations that 
become payable at death. Thus, once the decision is made to retain certain 
joint tenancies, the estate planner must become concerned with integrating 
the joint ownership into the over-all estate plan. 
SAFEGUARDING THE RELATIONSHIP 
One of the first problems to be faced is assuring, to the extent possible, 
that the facts of the joint tenancy relationship can be proved after one or 
more of the joint tenants have died. Closely related to this is making sure 
that the joint tenant's separate contribution to the joint tenancy property can 
be substantiated if and when necessary. In both situations the solution ordi- · 
narily lies in establishing, n1arshaling, and preserving the relevant evidence. 
Bank records, accounts, bills of sale, and other types of written proof of 
prior arrangements are most valuable in this respect, but affidavits of the 
parties concerning what they did and expended may suffice if competent 
extrinsic evidence cannot be collected. 
Problems of proof are particularly sticky where tangible personal property 
is involved. Ordinarily ownership interests in such property are transferred 
without any writing to record the transfer. As suggested earlier, difficult 
problems may arise where personalty is closely associated with real property 
held in joint tenancy, such as the machinery, livestock, and so on used on 
a farm held in joint tenancy. Many disputes may be avoided if the estate 
planner anticipates these difficulties and attempts to straighten out the rela-
tionships while the parties are all still alive. A simple memorandum signed 
tn7 See Young, CA-7 follows Sulliran in fie, ·erance of joint tenancies, stage set for High 
Cotat R eview, 17 J. Taxation 296 (1962). 
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by the parties tnay serve to avoid costly litigation and to n1initnize intra-family 
bickering. 
If the estate plan is premised on the continued existence of joint tenancies, 
the estate planner is well advised to counsel his clients concerning the trans-
actions that may cause a severance of the joint tenancy. Although, as dis-
cussed earlier, it is relatively rare that a joint tenancy will be unwittingly 
severed, one need only consider the result where joint tenants convey real 
estate by contract without specifying that the proceeds will be received as 
joint tenants to realize that such severance can occur .1 98 If, in such a case, 
the joint tenancy property so conveyed constituted the major asset in the 
estate, the success of the whole estate plan could well be imperiled. 
JOI~T TENANCY AND THE WILL 
No single misconception is probably n1ore detrimental to efficient estate 
planning than the belief among laymen that joint tenancy is a sufficient sub-
stitute for a will. Far from being a will substitute, in many cases the use of 
joint tenancy makes the execution of a will more essential than it might 
otherwise have been. For example, an elderly individual with a spouse and 
several children might be better advised, from both family and economic 
viewpoints, to let the intestate law divide all of his property than to pass the 
bulk of it to his aged spouse through use of joint tenancies and then permit 
her to take a substantial share of the remaining non-joint tenancy assets as a 
surviving spouse in intestacy. To avoid laboring the point, it is sufficient to 
assert that great difficulty would be found in trying to imagine a situation in 
which the use of the joint tenancy relationship completely obviates the need 
for a will. 
Also, as suggested earlier, caution is warranted in drafting the will lest 
joint tenancy property is inadvertently devised to some third party in a situa-
tion that might give rise to an estoppel claim agatnst the surviving joint tenant. 
If such a situation arises, litigation may be unavoidable. The following 
paragraphs suggest common reasons for the execution of a will by one who 
is a joint tenant. 
Individually Owned Property 
Although theoretically all property may be the subject of survivorship 
rights, as a practical n1atter certain kinds of property do not lend themselves 
to joint ownership, e.g., a valuable ring. It is therefore likely that even where 
the property owner is firn1ly committed to the holding of his property in 
joint tenancy, there will be certain items of individually owned property that 
must be disposed of. Sometimes such property can be given away inter vivos, 
but often the owner prefers to retain control until his death, so a will is 
indicated. 
lO See In re Bah.cr's Estate, 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 (1956). 
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Poss1bzltty of Survivorship 
The joint tenancy arrangen1ent 1~ only effective to pass property ownership 
among the joint tenants. If the survivorship feature is not destroyed, eventu-
ally the surviving joint tenant will own the property completely. But how is 
it possible to predict in advance who the surviving joint tenant will be? 
Because such prophesies are inherently fallible, each joint tenant must recog-
nize the possibility that he might eventually be the sole owner of the property 
and make plans in anticipation of that possibility. Where the mortality tables 
favor the chances for survivorship of a particular joint tenant, it is even 
more important that his plans take into account this probable enlargetnent 
of hts interest. It might be argued that once the survrvorship becomes a fact 
there will be plenty of time to decide what to do with the property. But this 
is not sound planning; it ignores the human tendency to procrastinate in 
acting in such matters, and more important, it overlooks the possibility of 
consecutive deaths within a relatively short time period, as discussed below . 
Simultaneous or Closely Consecutive Deaths 
The possibility of joint tenants dying in very close succession should be 
recognized and should be a conclusive argument in itself to prove the necessity 
of a will. Where there is no sufficient evidence that all JOint tenants died 
other than simultaneously, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act provides 
that the property shall be divided equally among them.1 nn This distribution 
may or may not accord with the wishes of the parties, but it emphasizes the 
need for a will to dispose intelligently of each joint tenant's interest. 
A greater likelihood is that the joint tenants' consecutive deaths \vill not be 
simultaneous, but will be sufficiently close to preclude effective planntng in 
the interim. If there is no will, the survivor's estate distributes the property 
in intestacy a result that few joint tenants would elect if provided a choice. 
Note that it is not possible to put into the will a time limitation on survivor-
ship that will prevent the property from being part of the estate of the sur-
vivor. The unavailability of such a planning option is a deftciency of the joint 
tenancy arrangement and not of the will. 
Need for Trustee, Guard1an, or Executor 
Where the family of the joint tenant contains minor children, incompetents, 
or others for whom special arrangements are required, a will creating a trust 
or designating a guardian is usually necessary. The comparison between a 
joint tenancy and a trust has been made earlier. The point here is that 
where there are persons dependent upon the joint tenant, especially minor 
children, it is good practice to have a \vill creating trusts to care for the de-
lnn Uniform Stmultaneous Death Act§ 3; Iov..a Code Ann.§ 633 525 (1964). 
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pendents and in the case of minor childtcn, to name a guardian of their person 
and property. 
Similarly, if there is any likelihood that the joint tenant's estate n1ay be 
administered, it is helpful to the surviving family to have a will designating 
who shall be the executor and if desirable, waiving his bond. Of course, such 
directions are not mandatory on the Probate Court, 200 but the court usually 
• 
acqutesces. 
LIQUIDITY 
The need for ample liquidity in the probate estate is a point the estate 
planner must always keep in n1ind. Estate administration proceeds most 
smoothly and usually most inexpensively when the estate contains a fund of 
cash, or property easily convertible into cash, sufficient to satisfy the payment 
of debts, expenses of the last illness and funeral, costs of administration, and 
death taxes. Where such liquidity is lacking the estate may suffer economic 
loss through a forced sale of non-hquid assets, or it may be necessary to sell 
or mortgage cherished personalty or real estate outc;tde the family, unless 
estate beneficiaries are willing to advance the costs out of their own pockets. 
The liquidity problem may be aggravated where a substantial portion of 
the decedent's property passes outside the probate estate through a survivor-
ship arrangement. Through use of the joint tenancy, property is placed beyond 
the reach of the decedent's personal representative, 201 but often its value is 
included in the estate for death tax purposes, thereby increasing the cash 
needs of the estate. Under Section 449 of the Iowa Probate Code such appor-
tionment of estate taxes is posstble only where the decedent's will or trust in-
strument so directs. In absence of a contrary express direction, the federal and 
state taxes are paid out of the property of the estate As a practical matter 
most wills contain a tax clause directing the payment of death taxes out of 
the residue of the probate estate. 
The liquidity problem is most acute where funds usually depended upon 
to supply the cash requirements of the estate are subject to survivorship 
rights. It is very often the case that a decedent's checking account, savings 
account, government bonds, and readtly salable stock are all held in joint 
tenancy. Life insurance proceeds are usually payable to named beneficiaries 
and therefore not directly available to the estate. 
This discussion only serves to highhght the potential for a shortage of estate 
liquidity that n1ay be associated with a heavy commitment to joint owner-
~oo See Iowa Code Ann. § 633.22 ( 1964) 
201 Both federal and state tax laws give the personal representative a l1mited right to 
collect taxes attributable to property pasc;ing outside the probate estate from the 
person recetvmg such property See Int Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 2206. 2207; 6 Mertens, 
Law of Federal Gift and Estate Taxation § 44.06 ( 1960) ; Iowa Code §§ 450.53, .54, 
.57 ( 1962); I CCH Inh. , Est. & Gift Tax Rep, Ia. 2035 ( 1960). 
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ship of property, and the in1portancc of the estate planner being conscious of 
the need to provide necessary liquidity where the client's testamentary plan 
should not be substantially upset. There may well be cases where the client 
cannot both keep his joint tenancies and be assured that his testamentary 
plan will not fail for lack of liquidity. If this is the situation, it should be 
explained to him fully so that he can decide \vhich aspect of his plan is really 
the more important to him. In many in tances the allegiance to the joint ten-
ancy may be expected to waiver \vhen the choice is presented in these terms. 
Some observers might suggest that life insurance is the easy solution to 
such a liquidity problem. The process \Vould be to simply calculate the 
amount of liquidity required and purchase a life insurance policy in that 
amount payable to the estate. In many cases this is not a realistic suggestion, 
owing to health or economic factors. Although life insurance may be a most 
valuable tool in the estate planners kit, it is not a free tool, and it falls con-
siderably short of being a panacea for the liquidity problem, and for most 
other estate planning problems, for that matter. 
CONCLUSION 
A reviewer of this monograph might voice the concern that, read as a 
whole, it manifests an unscholarly bias against the joint tenancy form of 
owning property. Perhaps this observation would be accurate, but the author 
did not approach the problem \vith such a predeliction. A critical examination 
of the uses to which survivorship rights currently are being put \Vas intended, 
rather than a criticism of the institution (and joint tenancy is just that) itself. 
Of itself, the joint tenancy form of ownership is neither good nor bad, 
wise nor unwise. It is a neutral form with great utility that takes on value 
connotations only when it is utilized in particular fact situations. Joint 
tenancy may be the most desirable estate planning vehicle in some circum-
stances and very foolhardy in others; the value judgment is entirely attnbut-
able to the context in which the joint tenancy is found. That joint tenancy 
is not a perfect and self-sufficient estate plan is no more a fair criticism of 
joint tenancy than it is of any other single estate planning technique. The 
knowledgeable and experienced estate planner can plan for, or around, or 
do away with, joint tenancy ownership with n1uch the same devices and by 
reference to the same standards as are utilized for other estate planning 
problems. 
Having said all this, however, any underlying prejudice again5t joint 
tenancy that the monograph might contain remains unexplained. The ex-
planation, if one be necessary, probably lies in the conjunction of t\\O essen-
tial factors: the nature of the estate planner's role and the incidence of joint 
tenancy ownership in Io\va. 
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To the extent that estate planning has become a specialization within the 
legal profession, the estate planner has ascended to the position of the fore-
most practitioner of "preventive law." A principle responsibility of the estate 
planner is to apply his expertise to his client's estate and try to anticipate and 
plan for all eventualities that might impede the maximum attainment of the 
client's estate planning goals. In fulfilling this duty, the estate planner is inclined 
to search particularly for things affecting the client's estate that might "go 
wrong." Joint tenancy has long been a prime suspect in this search, and 
for just cause. 
Initial reports from a field research project studying the use of joint ten-
ancies in Iowa show an incidence of use in excess of even the most liberal 
predictions. In one county over 80 percent of all deeds recorded in 1964 
named joint tenant grantees. The only conclusion that can be drawn from 
this kind of data is that for a substantial preponderance of the persons 
acquiring Iowa real property today, a decision, knowledgeable or otherwise, is 
being made in favor of joint ownership. r 
When the estate planning orientation of this monograph is considered in 
light of the enormous current popularity of joint tenancy, it would be sur-
prising if the overall tone of the discussion was not one of caution toward 
joint tenancy. The concern is not that too many people are using joint 
tenancy, it is that too few are using it knowledgeably . 
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